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ABSTRACT
The primary purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate 
that stability in the public sector of the economy in the 
sphere of personnel relations can only be achieved through a 
structured form of meaningful bilateral negotiations. This 
will be done by constructing a conceptual framework of the 
bargaining process, then applying this model to the situations 
that exist in the public sectors at the federal level in both 
the United States and Canada. This application will be done 
with the end in mind of showing that the degree of conformity 
is directly related to the degree of stability.
111
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most pressing problems in todayfe society 
is the question of personnel relations in the public sector. The 
immediacy and the magnitude of the problem can be seen in the 
fact that in both Canada and the United States, the government 
is the largest and fastest growing employer in the economy, and, 
as such, the importance of the relationships that exist between 
it and its' employees' is easily discernible. Yet stability in 
this sector, which is so important to the welfare of the economy 
and to the safety of the people, has not been achieved; proof 
of this statement is conveyed to us almost daily through the 
various mass media. It has become almost impossible to read a 
newspaper or listen to a news commentary without encountering 
an article, or hearing a news release which deals with the 
unstable personnel relations which exist in the public sector.
Personnel relations in this sector are in a state of 
flux; an environment of uneasiness and restlessness has permeated 
every level of government employment as a result of the public 
employees' concern over salaries and working conditions. This 
restlessness has been accompanied by a corresponding uneasiness 
on the part of the populace, created by fears for public order 
and safety in the face of public strikes and work stoppages. 
Strikes, such as the one in New York City by 10,000 members of 
the Uniformed Sanitationmen's Association, which resulted in 10,000 
tons of garbage accumulating every day; or the recent strike in 
Montreal (November, 1969) by the police force, which led to wide­
spread rioting, only heighten these fears and give a new impetus to 
the attempts being made to try to stabilize relations in the public
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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sector. Stabilizing relations does not imply the total elimination 
of industrial unrest. It only means that personnel relations are 
put in a context which enables both sides, management and labour, 
to work with each other in a constructive fashion in the hope 
that they can resolve their differences before such drastic action 
as outlined above is necessary.
In the private sector of the economy, before the 
emergence of unions and collective bargaining, industrial relations 
were also very unstable. The employer had absolute power* he hired 
and fired at his own discretion and he arbitrarily dictated the 
working conditions to which his employees would be subjected. The 
workers had no guarantees and no security* as long as they could 
find employment and keep it, they were fairly secure, but if they 
were beaten out of their job by stronger and more able men, they 
would no longer be in a position that would enable them to provide 
for their families. Their dependence on the labour market for 
their livelihood and well being was heightened by the absence of 
organized relief institutions that were backed by the wealth and 
by the power of the state. Neither the government nor the busi­
ness elite were concerned with the workmen's plight, and if the 
individual workers had not put away a portion of their wages to 
safeguard against unemployment, both they and their families 
would go hungry. The workers were also at a disadvantage because 
the American business elite always ensured that a suitable labour 
market was present by manipulating immigration, and when this 
was not possible, the black man.1
I
For a discussion of the American negro and his role as a supply
component on the labour market, see Eli Ginzberg and Alfred S.
Eichner, The Troublesome Presence, New York.* Mentor Book, 196^.
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The labour force as a consequence of the competitive 
market could almost be considered to be in a Hobbesian state of 
nature. The lack of uniform labour practices and regulations 
meant that the men did not have any common bonds or central 
power structure to regulate their relationship with one another. 
The cut-throat activity that resulted from this situation, is 
a matter of history which can be seen very clearly in the United 
States in the 1930's, when the depression heightened the 
competition between the workers
That labour relations in the private sector are no 
longer unregulated and abusive is due primarily to the presence 
of unions and collective bargaining. Relations between the 
employer and the employee are no longer governed on a unilateral 
basis, but are rather the result of bilateral negotiations which 
take place between the two parties in a collective bargaining 
framework. The bargaining process, as it has developed in 
the private sector, has had a great deal of utility as it has 
helped to regulate and to stabilize the once unpredictable 
relationship which existed between labour and management. The 
concretion of the relationship between the two has been to the 
advantage of both as it has allowed each to plan their activities^
2
The conditions that existed in the labour market prior to and 
during the depression, are brought out very dramatically in 
John Steinbeck's, The Grapes of Wrath, and in Upton Sinclair's, 
The Jungle, "can't tell ya about them little fella's layin' 
in the tent with their bellies puffed out an' jus' skin on 
their bones, an* shiverin' an' whinin' like pups, an' me 
runnin* aroun' tryin* to get work —  not for money, not for 
wages!" he shouted, "Jesus Christ, jus* for a cup o flour an* 
a spoon o lard. An* then the coroner come." John Steinbeck, 
The Grapes of Wrath, New Yorki Yiking Press, 1939* P» 260. 
"That was the competitive wage system; .... The workers were 
dependent upon a job to exist from day to day, and so bid 
against each other, and no man could get more than the lowest 
man would consent to work for." Upton Sinclair, The Jungle, 
New Yorki The New American Library, Inc., 1905» p. 308.
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without an excessive fear of labour disruptions during the 
duration of a contract. The utility of the bargaining process 
has been that it has substituted a predictable and stable 
element in the relationship between the employer and the 
employee, for a very tenuous one.
In the public sector of the economy, the relations 
between the employer ana the employee, have not followed the 
same course as in the private sector. This is due primarily 
to the theory of sovereignty which views the state as an omni­
potent or monistic entity. The theory advances the belief that 
the modern state "possesses, or should possess, a single source 
of authority that is theoretically comprehensive and unlimited 
in its exercise".^ The state is the ultimate power in the 
society and as such, its dictates cannot and must not be 
questioned? "it issues orders to all men and associations... 
it receives orders from none of them".**'
Inherent in this concept of sovereignty is the theory 
of sovereign immunity, which implies that the sovereign power is 
not amenable to a suit by an individual without its consent.
As Alexander Hamilton wrote,
The contracts between a nation and an indivi­
dual, are only binding on the conscience of 
the sovereign and have no pretensions to be a 
comprehensive force. They confer no right 
faction, independent of the sovereign will.->
Kung Chuan Hsiao, Political Pluralism, London: Kegan Paul,
Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd., 1927* P* 2.
4
Harold J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics, London: George Allen
and Unwin Ltd., 1967* p.
5 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalists, Modern Library edition, 
1937, pp. 529-530.
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The origin of this concept can he dated back to the 
time of absolute monarchy in England when the kings claimed to 
rule by divine right. The ruler was the nucleus of all legis­
lative, executive, and judicial authority, and as he supposedly 
exercised these prerogatives with divine guidance, it was incon­
ceivable that any citizen would initiate action against him.
"The doctrine of sovereign immunity was a self-evident truth to 
anyone who subscribed to the maxim, the King can do no wrong."u 
Blackstone expanded on this point when he wrote; "The King 
moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of 
thinking wrong; in him is no folly or weakness.
Since this theory suggests that whatever the govern­
ment does is right, it follows that the state cannot be compelled 
by either an individual or by a group of citizens to act against 
its will which means, of course, that the activities associated 
with collective bargaining do not readily lend themselves to 
adaptation in the public sector. Bargaining activity, as will 
be seen in chapter I, leads to a collective agreement, and this 
places restrictions on both signatories; a collective agreement
O
is in essence a contractual relationship between two parties,0 
and this type of association is not possible as long as a 
Government refuses to deviate from the theoretical stance of 
sovereign immunity.
ft Wilson R. Hart, Collective Bargaining m  the Federal Civil 
Service, New York's Harper and Brother, 196^, p. 4l.
n
Quoted in ibid., p. ^1.
8 See Chapter I, supra., p. 23 for clarification of this point.
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By the I960's in Canada, and the United States, however, 
it had become apparent that if stability was going to be main­
tained in the public sector the governments of these respective 
countries were going to have to relinquish some of their sovereign 
prerogatives# This course of action was necessitated because of 
the pressures that were being exerted on them to abandon the 
unilateral and paternalistic mold which had hitherto characterised 
personnel relations* What was being demanded was the introduction 
of a new system of employer-employee relations based on the 
concept of bilateral negotiations.
In order to implement, this demand, and as will be shown 
in chapter II implementation was essentia] in order to ensure 
stability, both governments turned to the collective bargaining 
structure as it had developed in the private sector to see if 
it could be adapted to their unique environments. The result 
was that in both Canada and the United States the government 
voluntarily agreed to limit its sovereignty in certain areas 
under normal conditions to allow a form of collective bargaining 
for its public employees# The new system of employer-employee 
relations substituted bilateral negotiations for the old base 
of unilateral decision making#
The primary aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that 
if labour-management relations in the public sector are going to 
be structured on a basis of bilateral negotiations It is impera­
tive that these relationships be embodied in a collective 
bargaining framework. If they are not the system can only breed 
instability.
In order to pursue this goal it is necessary to first
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analyze collective bargaining as it has evolved in the private 
sector in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the 
process and the connotations that have come to be attached to 
this activity. This general discussion of collective bargaining 
will serve two purposes; first, it will provide a basis on which 
future discussions of the process can be structured by explaining 
the terms and processes which are involved in it, and second, 
the discussion of the basic mechanisms of collective bargaining 
will facilitate the development of a framework. Once a concep­
tual framework has been developed in chapter I, a discussion of 
the inevitability of bilateral negotiations in the Canadian 
public sector will be initiated in chapter 11,9 Chapters III 
and IV will be devoted to the application of the bargaining 
framework developed in chapter I to the structured forms of 
bargaining as they exist in the American and Canadian public 
sectors. The conclusion will consolidate the observations and 
conclusions obtained in the two previous chapters into a 
general hypothesis which will substantiate my contention that 
the basic framework of collective bargaining must be duplicated 
in the public sector before stability can be achieved.
9 The Canadian experience rather than the American experience is 
used to demonstrate the need to implement bilateral negotiations 
because of the accessibility to documents and other relevant 
material on the former and the inaccessibility of such material 
for the latter. However, a brief discussion on the American 
situation will be included in the first part of chapter III,
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CHAPTER I
Collective Bargaining in the Private Sector
The term 'collective bargaining* was coined by Sydney 
and Beatrice Webb in 1891.^ At first, limited connotations 
were associated with the phrase, as the activities linked with 
it were confined almost exclusively to discussions concerning 
wage rateso However, the evolution of the bargaining process, 
which has taken place since that time, has'broadened its' scope 
to such an extent that today its usage covers the entire spectrum
of organized relationships which exist between the employer and
o
the employee. One legal definition of the term iss
The performance of the mutual obligation of 
the employer and the representative of the 
employees to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agree­
ment, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written contract 
incorporating any agreement reached, if 
requested by either party, but such an 
obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession.^
Although the term, 'collective bargaining', was not instituted 
until 1891* many of the processes which are associated with 
the term, and which will be discussed in this chapter, origi­
nated prior to this date. For a discussion of collective 
bargaining activities prior to 1891* see Neil W. Chamberlain, 
Collective Bargaining, New Yorks McGraw-Hill Book Co. Ltd., 
1951, pp. 1-46?
2
For an excellent discussion on the expansion of the scope 
of collective agreements see, "Labour Legislation and 
Collective Bargaining in the America's", International 
Labour Review, vol. 84 (October, 1961), pp. 282-283.
3 Bevars D. Maby, Labour Relations and Collective Bargaining,
New Yorks The Ronald Press Co., 1966, p. 179* For an 
alternative discussion of the modern usage of the term 
collective bargaining, see Harold W. Davey, Contemporary 
Collective Bargaining, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.t Prentice- 
Hall, 1951* PP« 6-7.
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Collective bargaining, therefore, is a bilateral process, 
through which two participants negotiate the terms and condi­
tions which will regulate their relationships with one another.^
These two participants are management on the one hand 
and, on the other, the union, or its bargaining agent.^ The 
former represents the stock-holders or owners of the company, 
and the latter represents the employees in the bargaining unit. 
These two parties, however, are not free to negotiate in an 
unrestricted or unrestrained fashion because they are both 
subject to internal and external pressures.
Internal pressures are applied against both the 
parties engaged in collective bargaining activity because both 
the unions and the companies are complex organizations that 
are characterized by specialization and differentiation of 
responsibilities, and this diffusion of authority makes internal 
conflict almost a certainty. An illustration of this diffusion 
can be seen in the fact that both management and the bargaining 
agent normally delegate their powers regarding negotiations,
For the purposes of this paper, I will follow Maby's and 
Davey's view of collective bargaining which was that the 
process covers the entire spectrum of organized relationships 
that exist between union and labour. It should be pointed 
out, however, that there is an opposing point of view which 
breaks this spectrum into two parts; contract administration 
and contract interpretation, with the term 'collective 
bargaining' being associated with only the former. See 
Neil W. Chamberlain, "Grievance Proceedings and Collective 
Bargaining", Richard A. Lester and Joseph Shister, (eds.), 
Insights Into Labour Issues, New Yorks Macmillan, 1.9^ 8, p. 86.
A "bargaining agent is the certified representative of the 
bargaining unit" and "bargaining unit means a unit of employees 
appropriate for collective bargaining"; see the Labour 
Relations Act, R.S.O. (i960), c. 202, s. 5(1)»
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first to a negotiations committee, and ultimately to a chief 
negotiator.^ Therefore, when trying to discern what internal 
pressures are applied against the negotiating process, one 
has to look at the role of the chief negotiator and work 
back from there.
Most of the studies dealing with the dynamics of 
interactions between institutions, have been undertaken under 
the "simplifying assumption that chief negotiators act with a 
single purpose in mindj to carry out the wishes of the 
organization they represent". But this1underlying assumption 
is not exactly correct, because organizations, although they 
are structured on a hierarchical basis, do not have a mono­
lithic goal pattern. This is not to say that organizations 
do not have a well defined goal pattern which permeates the
6 For a comprehensive discussion of bargaining agents and 
management and their devolution of power, see Edward E.
Herman, "Determination of the Appropriate Bargaining Unit", 
Occasional Papers L2-26, Department of Labour, (November,
1966), pp. 2-6.
? Robert B. McKersie, Charles R. Perry and Richard E. Walton, 
"Intra-organizational Bargaining in Labour Negotiations", 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 9 (December, 1965), 
p. 463* For an interesting discussion concerning whether 
these internal divisions and conflicts should be allowed 
to appear at the bargaining table, principle of dissent, 
or whether they should be suppressed, principle of unanimity, 
see William M. Evan and John A. MacDougall, "Interorgani- 
zational Conflicts A Labour-Management Bargaining Experiment", 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. XI (December, 1967), 
pp. 398-^130 See also Thomas Schellings, Strategy of Conflict, 
New Yorks Oxford Press, 1963, pp. 21-3^, for a discussion of 
how the cohesive of demands effects the bargaining strategy.
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structure from the top to the bottom, but rather that this 
pattern can only be the ultimate goal of the organization.
The specialization and differentiation of responsibilities, 
within the structure itself, gives use to different inter­
mediary goals through which their initiators hope to pursue 
and to achieve, the ultimate goals of the organization.
It is these sub-goals that exist within the organi­
zation, which apply pressure on the negotiating process. 
Pressure is applied because each specialized function in the 
organizational hierarchy wants to ensure that the negotiator 
follows a policy which is conducive to its own plans and 
desires. Figure one illustrates this point.^
Figure 1
Union
GOALS OF INTERNATIONAL 
UNION
GOALS OF LOCAL UNION
GOALS OF NEGOTIATING 
COMMITTEE
*»
m
CA
T>y>
TO
(Al/V
c;73m
'■V
Chief
Negotiator
GOALS OF UNION 
OFFICIALS
GOALS OF RANK AND 
FILE
Company 
GOALS OF THE COMPANY
GOALS OF TOP MANAGEMENT I
GOALS OF WAGE
ADMINISTRATORS
Chief
Negotiator
uy 4rs
7$ n»
GOALS OF STAFF GROUPS
GOALS OF PERSONNEL 
DEPARTMENT
GOALS OF INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS
8 This diagram is a modified version of one which appeared in 
McKersie, op.cit., p. 463.
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Internal influences, however, extend beyond the 
pressures which are applied by the organization and its 
component parts; they are also present within the minds of 
the negotiating team. The men involved in the negotiating 
process cannot divorce their own values, beliefs, perceptions 
and images from their work, and as a consequence, the verstehen 
influence becomes an important variable in the process. The 
verstehen influence is an important variable because it suggests 
that an actor sees behavior solely on the basis of his under- 
standing of his own motivations. Therefore, concept formation 
and planned strategy cannot be construed on neutral grounds 
but must be the result of each individual's perception of him­
self and his drives. Consequently, each actor in the negotiating 
team can be seen to have a personnel influence on the outcome 
of the negotiations.^ Weber, however, would not have accepted 
this last statement; he would have argued that if the organi­
zation was structured in a legal-rational fashion-**® all outputs 
of the organization, including any collective agreement, would 
be fairly value free due to the filtering process that is 
inherent in all such structures. But, I would suggest one can 
question the applicability of Weber's argument in this case;
9 For a discussion of the Weberian concept of the verstehen 
operation, see* Arthur L. Kalleberg, "Concept Formation in 
Normative and Empirical Studies", American Political Science 
Review, vol. 63, 1969, pp. 26-39*
1 0Weber claimed that advanced bureaucracies stand in a specific 
sense under the principle of sine ira ac studio. This means 
that bureaucracies are dehumanized; they eliminate from 
official business love, hatred and all purely personal, 
irrational and emotional elements. See Max Weber, Essays in 
Sociology, edited by H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, New Yorki 
Oxford University Press, 1958, pp. 215-216.
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the negotiating team and the chief negotiator, although they 
are responsive to influences from their respective organizations, 
are not part of a structural hierarchy when they are involved 
in negotiationse
Figure (2) illustrates, that in the collective bargai­
ning process, the filtering process does not function properly 
because all pressures are not filtered through the organization. 
Some of the pressure is exerted, as illustrated, directly on 
the negotiator. Therefore, the bargaining process is not 
strictly a rational one. This leaves the negotiator with a 
greater flexibility in determining outputs than in any other 
process in the organization and this means, of course, that he 
is more vulnerable to his own verstehen prejudices.
Figure 2
RATIONAL
OUTPUT
RATIONAL £ 
OUTPUT
Normally in a legal-rational structure, the verstehen processes 
are filtered out as the policies move up the hierarchy. Even if 
the policy is emitted from the organization at a level lower than 
the apex, the policy has had some filtering, and is still 
considered to be rational.
* CHIEF
* NEGOTIATOR
For the negotiating process, however, the structure can be consi­
dered to be departmentalized with each department exerting influ­
ence directly on the negotiator, without the benefit of any prior 
filtering process.
u f f 'I't 
L -j\ f f 'F T f   ^
A f  f  f I'T t 11
/JV /f> yji. yp. / Jv .-Jv
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Besides the major sources of internal pressure which 
have heen discussed above, there are also a number of external 
forces which apply pressure on both the negotiating process 
and on the two organizations involved; these are labour laws, 
the mutual need for co-operation, public opinion, the relative 
public interest and the threat of industrial warfare. These 
influences are extremely important, as they help to mould the 
images and attitudes of the two sides, and both must incor­
porate them into their valuations and judgements.
The requirements of law are an important influence 
that must be taken into account by both sides because they 
define the parameters within which management and union operate. 
For example, in 1944 Canada introduced the Wartime Relations 
Regulations in Dominion Order In Council P.C. 1003;^  these 
regulations were patterned after the United States' Wagner 
Act of 1935*12 They legislated that a corporation not only had 
to recognize a union that had obtained certification from the 
National Labour Relations Board, but also stipulated that it 
must meet, and negotiate, in good faith with the designated 
agent. Labour laws, besides this one basic example, also affect 
the company's and the union's manoeuvrability by defining mini­
mum wage levels and the maximum number of hours that an employee 
can be required to work under. Labour legislation also dictates
H  For a discussion of these regulations and the Industrial 
Relations and Disputes Investigation Act (IRDI) of 1948, 
which replaced them, see Herman, op.cit., pp. 21-2?.
12 por a discussion of the National Labour Relations (Wagner)
Act of 1935, see Neil W. Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining, 
op.cit., pp. 300-301.
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the conditions under which the union may be certified, the 
size of the bargaining unit and the type of unit that is to 
be r e c o g n i z e d . ^3 ^ g  a b o v e  examples are only a few illu- 
strations of the host of statutes that affect both union 
and management, but they sufficiently demonstrate the point 
that both union and management have to be consciously aware 
of the limitations this external pressure places on their 
activities.
The second external influence that exerts pressure
on each of the organizations and, therefore, has to be taken
into account, is the need for mutual co-operation on the part
of both management and labour. There exists between these
two parties a genuine interdependence. Both realize that they
are dependent on the ongoing enterprise, and consequently are
15limited m  the commitments they make by the requirement that
1 ftthe enterprise must be kept going. The company realizes 
that it requires employees to carry out the various functions 
that are essential to its production, and the employees recognize
*3 These legislative acts all come under the jurisdiction of 
respective Federal and Provincial Labour Relations Boards.
For a detailed discussion of Labour Laws and their effect 
on the bargaining process, see Charles Lipton, The Trade 
Union Movement of Canada, 1827 - 1959* Montreal! Canadian 
Social Publications Ltd., i960. Also H.D. Woods and 
L. Ostry, Labour Policy and Labour Economics in Canada,
Torontos MacMillan, 1964, pp. 3-159•
15 "Commitments ' is used here to denote a bargaining stance that 
is non-negotiable. See Schelling op.cit., pp. 24-28.
1 ft Survival in this context refers to the economic definition 
which stipulated that a satisfactory profit must be made 
to induce the entrepeneur to continue the operation.
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their need for employments Therefore, since hoth sides realize
their need for one another, a mutual ground for co-operation
evolves, and as a result introduces a cautionary element into
17the stance of hoth sides. '
This concept of co-operation as a restraining device
that ensures the continuance of the operation, which is taken
to be relative to the optimum position of both the employer
and the employee, was brought out by Zeuthen when he constructed
1 fthis utility frontier; see figure (3)»
Figure 3
Utility of Management
Utility Frontier
lit Utility of Union
The points P^-P? represent the offers of the union and the 
management respectively. These points show the differing 
degrees of utility that will be achieved by each side. Settle­
ment can only come about when ^ 2 2 ^ 2 1 ^ 1 1 ^ 1 2  which is shown 
by P3.
For a discussion of the cautionary element in bargaining 
necessitated by the survival instinct see Schelling, 
op.cit., pp0 21-22.
For a complete discussion of Zeuthen*s utility frontier 
and general theory of bargaining, see Robert L. Bishop,
"A Zeuthen-Hicks Theory of Bargaining", Econometrica, 
vol. 32 (July, 196*0, pp. l'lG-417. Also see Edward 
Saragdar, "Zeuthen*s Theory of Bargaining", Econometrica, 
voli 33 (October, 1965). pp* 802-813*
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He suggested that the bargaining undertaken by both sides, 
take place upon the utility frontier, and that eventual 
settlement results from the bargainers conducting their 
activities in a rational fashion. By rational, Zeuthen means 
that each part considers holding out for a more favourable 
settlement than the one offered to him, only when he feels 
that such an action will yield a positive expected gain.
A positive gain, he argues, cannot be obtained by either 
side if an irreconcilable conflict arises: therefore, both 
sides, when they pursue net gains, will be sure to stay on 
the utility frontier which represents all solutions that 
are both possible and practical.^9
The third external influence that plays an active 
role in determining the direction and limitations of demands 
on the part of both management and labour, is public opinion. 
The pressure exerted by this force is very potent, and as a 
consequence, must be weighed very carefully by both sides.
A miscalculation by either could alienate public opinion, 
which would create a very precarious foundation for either of
19
The co-operative element as a restraining force is played 
down by Vernon H. Jensen, "The Process of Collective 
Bargaining and the Question of it’s Obsolescence", Industrial 
and Labour Relations Review, vol. 16 (July, 19&3), 
pp. 5^6-55^0 H® suggests that collective bargaining is not 
a process of reasoning, nor is it primarily a process of 
economic analysis; he claims that it is a relationship 
which is based on the sole criteria of power. The settle­
ment which is finally agreed upon is not the culmination 
of rational arguments based on market conditions and 
prevailing economic tendencies, but is rather the result 
of a primitive power struggle when each side attempts to 
extract as much from its opponents as its relative strength 
permits.
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their respective positions. Reasons for the potency of this 
force are; first, it has a real and definite effect on the 
morale of both the management and the union; and second, it 
may provoke legislative action aimed at settling the dispute 
to the detriment of one of the parties involved.
Public opinion's effect on the morale of both 
participants is an important variable on the outcome of any 
dispute; for example, if the public is favourable to the 
position of the union, its membership is reinforced by the 
knowledge that it is not standing alone against management.
The financial hardships that are imposed upon the employees 
due to the dispute, are alleviated somewhat by the moral 
support that comes from the community. The bargaining unit's 
position is also enhanced by their knowledge that, management, 
in the face of adverse public opinion, is probably going to 
be compelled to retract from its position; if the company does 
not do so, it is running the risk of being blamed for prolonging 
the strike, which may very well alienate the public from its
OA
products in the long run. If, conversely, public opinion 
is favourable to the position of the company, the above effects 
are reversed. The union feels not only isolated from the 
company, but also from the entire community and the psycholo­
gical impact on its membership may weaken their position
20
The argument can be made that the alienation of the public 
to a company is also detrimental to the position of union 
membership in the long run, as it may cut down on employment 
levels. However, for the purposes of this paper, we will 
assume that the company's growth rate, rather than its 
present capacity, is placed in jeopardy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- I n ­
considerably# The company, when it has public opinion on its 
side, will be reluctant to give in to the union's demands 
because it will feel that it is operating from a position of 
strength.
Public opinion, beside giving moral support to 
participants, may also result in governmental intervention 
or legislative action aimed at terminating the dispute, and 
when the government intervenes in a conflict it cannot do so 
in a completely neutral fashion. Thus public opinion can 
force the government to take action, and when it does, it 
usually will be sympathetic to the side public opinion is 
favouringo For example, in 19^5 the public was outraged at 
reports that the U.A.W. had withdrawn all their maintenance 
men from the Ford power house in Windsor; an act that not 
only completely crippled the Ford operation, but actually 
endangered the property. The public outcry initiated by this 
behavior, forced Ontario's Premier Drew to act; he requested 
immediate assistance from Prime Minister Mackenzie King, who 
responded by authorizing the dispatch of Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police reinforcements to Windsor, and by mobilizing tanks and
pi
troops in Camp Borden. x
Public opinion is therefore an important variable 
which sets the limits in which the participants involved in 
the bargaining process are free to act. If they overstep 
these limits they arouse public hostility, and as a consequence, 
a great deal of pressure can be levied against them which 
cannot help but hurt their stance. The importance of public
21 For a complete discussion of the Ford strike, see Saragdar, 
op.cit., pp. ^8-50*
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opinion can be seen in the fact that during a strike, or just 
prior to it, both sides attempt to win public support or at 
least try to ensure that it is not hostile to them.
The fourth external influence that has an effect on 
both management and labour is the related concept of the 
public good.22 Modern society is not a laissez-faire one 
where each component is free to pursue its own ends oblivious 
to the needs of the others. Today all gains in society must 
be relative? that is, every organization must ensure that its 
programmes are in concert with the aims of the entire society. 
If they are not, the society will not tolerate them and will 
force changes through legal means. Therefore, each participant 
in the bargaining process must ensure that its position falls 
within the range of public tolerance which is defined by the 
general aims of the society; if they do not, they face almost 
certain interference on the part of the government. Examples 
of this type of interference can be seen in many Latin American 
countries where foreign owned companies are forced to alter 
their relationship with their domestic employees if they wish 
to continue operating.
The fifth external influence that has an effect on 
both management and labour is the threat of industrial warfare. 
This activity includes an entire spectrum of alternatives 
ranging from a shutting down of the plant by the company, to
Qp
For a discussion on this external influence, see Arnold R. 
Weber, Collective Bargainings Problems and Perspectives,
New York* The Free Press of Glencoe Inc., 19&1, pp. xxviii 
to xxxii.
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a strike "by the workers. The threat of any such action is a 
very significant influence, "because this type of activity has 
serious implications for both the company and the workers.
When a serious dispute breaks out between a company 
and a union, both sides have a number of alternative courses 
of action they can threaten to pursue. The company in the 
case of hostilities can use the suicidal technique of going 
out of business;23 or it can attempt to weaken the union by 
either forcing a strike when environmental conditions are 
unfavourable, or they can jam the grievance procedure to 
undermine the Union's effectiveness and "use their superior 
financial resources to carry numerous grievances to arbitration, 
to pauperize a union's treasury".2** Another tactic open to 
the company is the formation of employer leagues with other 
industries such as the Canadian Manufacturers Association. 
Collectively the members of the C.M.A. constitute a very 
formidable body, and as such, are in an excellent position to 
wage a propanganda war against unionism; this has the effect 
of further weakening the union's treasury because the unions 
have to retaliate. Management organizations also take an 
active role lobbying in both Ottawa and the provincial capital
for anti-labour legislation.^
^  The threat of this technique was used in Windsor in the Spring 
of 1969 when the Plasticast Corporation, a division of Noranda 
Mines threatened to close down their plant. The warning was 
credible to the union and helped to bring about a settlement.
2^ Mabry, op.cit., p. 375*
25 For a discussion on the organization and some of the activities 
of the Canadian Manufacturers Association, see Francois Lemieux, 
"Lobbying Plus the C.M.A.", Politics Canada, Paul Fox (ed.), 
Toronto1 McGraw-Hill Co., 1966.
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Another weapon at the disposal of management, is its legal
ability to utilize strike breakers.
The unions, on the other hand, also have a number
of weapons at their disposal. In a labour dispute the strategy
of each party is to bring as much pressure on the opponent as
possible in order to force him to concede the issue or issues
at hand, and the union accomplishes this objective primarily
by utilizing its most potent weapon, the strike.
The strike has been the traditional means 
used to resolve serious conflicts in the 
private sector if negotiations failed to 
produce a peaceful settlement. In most 
cases, striking employees leave the plant, 
one or more pickets are posted, the situa­
tion is publicized and the plant does not 
operate, as all services are withheld.
The workers by "voluntarily withholding their labour,
deprive an employer of an essential r e s ou rc e" ,w hi ch  is
required for the operation of the firm. This weapon can even
become more powerful if the unions are able to extend their
influence to other workers servicing the company, as this
type of activity can deprive the employer of other essential
resources or separate him from his markets. But unions can
only utilize the strike legally at a specific stage in the
negotiations process, usually after conciliation, and as a
result have to rely upon other weapons at the other stages.
J.H. Foeger, "The Partial Strike* A Solution in Public 
Employment", Public Personnel Review, vol. 30 (April,
1969), p. 85.
Mabry, op.cit., p. 37?•
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It may encourage its workers to resort to slowdowns, sabotage, 
or absenteeism, all of which wreak havoc with a company's 
production schedule, and which can result in severe financial 
loss to the manufacturer.
Also, unions, like management, utilize lobbying and 
propaganda techniques in a continuous attempt to ensure 
suitable government policies and a favourable public image, 
as both of these factors are necessary prerequisites to the 
creation of a suitable labour environment.
The above discussions have illustrated the point 
that labour laws, the mutual need for co-operation, public 
opinion, the relative public interest, and the threat of 
industrial warfare are all potent external influences that 
effect the bargaining process; neither side can afford to 
ignore any of them when formulating their bargaining strategy. 
Each party must ensure that during the give and take process 
of negotiating they keep in touch with the internal goals of 
the organization while remaining at the same time in concert 
with the external forces being applied against them. If they 
do not, the negotiations, which may be looked upon as a 
conversion process leading to the collective agreement, will 
probably be to their detriment.
The negotiations that take place between management 
and labour are, "akin to the creation of a constitution"; 
the collective agreement that comes out of the conversion
John T. Dunlop and James J. Healy, Collective Bargaining;
Principles and Cases, Howewood, Illinoiss Richard D. Irwin, 
Inc., 1953> P» 8^.
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process, like a constitution of a state, tries to reflect past 
experiences while at the same time attempting to embody provisions 
aimed at covering all possible eventualities. The collective 
agreement's adaptative task is made somewhat easier, however, 
in that it comes up for renewal after a specific length of 
time, which usually is between one and three years.
Therefore, since no two unions or companies have 
had an identical past or expect to experience exactly the same 
future, no two labour agreements can be exactly alike. However, 
the categories into which the terms of all labour agreements 
can be classified are fairly uniform. These classifications 
ares the coverage and applicability of the agreement, wages 
and wage supplement programmes, working time, seniority and 
job rights, and operating rules and industrial jurisprudence. ^
The first section of the collective agreement is 
usually concerned with the coverage and the applicability of 
the agreement. It contains a number of clauses which provide
29
An alternative classification of the collective agreement 
was set forth by Professor H.D. Woods in his essay "Some 
Problems Related to Collective Bargaining in the Public 
Service", Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, 
Fredericton, N.B.s Canadian Labour Federation, (May 5, 
i960). In this article he claimed that the agreement 
could be broken down into three parts; first clauses 
which deal with the relationship between the two parties 
which include (a) the union recognition clause, and (b) 
the management's rights clause; second, the substantive 
clauses which contain employment standards; and third, 
the procedural clauses which establish the steps to be 
taken to ensure that the rights shall be protected and 
obligations observed. This classification scheme is set 
out in greater detail in H.D. Woods and Sylvia Ostry, 
Labour Policy and Labour Economics in Canada, Torontos 
MacMillan of Canada, 1962, pp. 12-15•
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the foundation for the rest of the agreement: for example,
the clauses usually state the purpose of the agreement;
identify the parties bound by the agreement; outline the
rights and responsibilities of each, and define the duration
30for which the agreement is valid.
A second segment of the contract deals with wages 
and. wage supplement plans as a single category; for together, 
they constitute .labour costs to the e m p l o y e r , A s  a result, 
this section is one of the most complex of any appearing in 
the agreement, as it not only has to establish a classification, 
but also has to deal with such wage supplements as holiday 
and vacation pay, pension plans, separation payments, insurance 
policies, hospitalization or disability benefits, and supple­
mentary employment benefits. It is usual to also include in 
this section, a. number of clauses which deal, with the rights 
of laid-off and retired employees in so far as the above 
benefits are concerned. The clauses stipulate the procedures 
to be followed in determining their eligibility for the benefit 
programmes. This section also defines the financial, contribu­
tions for the various programmes that are to be made by both.
30
An example of a collective agreement which conforms roughly 
to this classification scheme, is given in Chamberlain, 
Collective Bargaining, op.cit., Appendix R., pp. ^99-525. 
The agreement reproduced in these pages is the one which 
was signed by General Motors and the United Auto Workers on 
May 29, 1950.
31
See M.W. Neder, "The Theory of Union Wage Policy", in 
Labour and Trade Unionism, New Yorks John Wiley and. Sons, 
i960, pp’o 3-2?.
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the company and the employees? sets forth the means of adminis­
tering the programmes; outlines the benefits to he provided by 
these activities, and specifies the appeal procedure which 
will he provided to handle any disputes and grievances.
The third section dealing with the working time of 
the employees is also a very intricate part of the collective 
agreement.32 jt is closely aligned to the second section as it 
specifies the amount of time that an amployee will have to work 
before he qualifies for the specified wage rates and wage 
supplements® But this section is far more inclusive than this 
statement would suggest, as the clauses in this segment usually 
govern the days that will be worked, the number of hours per day, 
which hours of the day the employees will be required to 
which. may a] so include shift rr,x” ticn, the .'’mount of td me that 
can be devoted to set-up, washup and housekeeping, and the 
number of breaks or reliefs that the employee can take. As a 
result, working time constitutes an important ingredient of 
the agreement for both the employer and the employee. The 
former is concerned with the regulations controlling the hours 
of work, because various time studies have demonstrated that 
the number of hours worked, directly influence the unit labour 
cost. But, besides allowing the company to ensure that its 
marginal cost of labour always remains properly proportionate 
to the unit cost, the stipulations regarding hours of work
32
For a thorough discussion of this section of the collective 
agreement, see Maurice S. Trotta, Collective Bargaining,
New Yorks Simons-Boardsman, 1961," pp. 251-256®
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also allow it to run the plant in an efficient manner, as it 
is able to draw up its production plans months in advance.
The latter is interested in the hours of work that are going 
to be expected of him, because it is only through a detailed 
knowledge of both his obligations and rights concerning his 
working time, that an employee can plan his leisure time.
A fourth section of the collective agreement usually 
deals with seniority and job rights. "In a society ruled by 
law rather than men, arbitrary and capricious actions by those 
in authority that influence the lives of others, are restricted 
by rules and regulations".33 Collective agreements attempt to 
extend this rule of law to the industrial sphere. Of funda­
mental importance to every worker, are questions pertaining to 
job rights, promotion, transfer, demotion, lay-off and recall, 
shift selection and job assignments. If peace and goodwill are 
to prevail in the industry, it is important that some arrange­
ments be made that are considered to be fair and just in order 
that the job rights can be determined and job opportunities 
can be allocated in an agreeable fashion. The basic solution 
that has been accepted in most industries is the one based on 
the seniority principle.3^
Seniority systems, however, are very complex and fall 
into many conflicting categoriesj the two main ones are most
33 Mabry, op.cit;, p. 337*
rth
For an interesting and concise discussion on seniority, 
see James J. Healy, Creative Collective Bargaining,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965*
pp. 33-3^. In his discussion of seniority, the author 
mentions a new term, 'juniority*, which is gaining 
popularity in plants with substantial supplementary 
unemployment benefits.
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commonly referred to as straight seniority and qualified 
seniority. "Straight seniority signifies that length of 
service is a prime requisite for any preferences, while 
qualified seniority implies that an employee must have specific 
qualifications, such as experience and specialized skills to 
receive a p r e f e r e n c e . "35 There definitions, however, give 
rise to a number of questions such ass To whom does seniority 
apply? How is seniority computed? How may it be lost?
Each industry has its own conditions that determine 
the answers to these questions. It usually takes a number of 
years of trial and error before a definition can be formulated 
that is adequate to meet both the operating needs of the 
company and the workers' concept of justice. However, there 
are a number of general principles that can be mentioned and 
examined.
Seniority is usually only granted to full-time 
employees after they have finished a probationary period, and 
is dated either from the day of employment, or the day probation 
is terminated. It may be based on the length of service in the 
company, within a department, within a particular plant, or on 
the job, depending on the stipulations in the collective 
agreement. Each individual contract will also specify how 
seniority may be lost, but a number of common reasons ares 
discharge for cause, voluntary quitting, failure to return 
within a stipulated period during lay-off, and absence from 
work for a given period of time without notice.
35 Trotta, op.cit., p. 356.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 29 -
Seniority is one of the most useful concepts in 
labour relations, as it is used not only to determine a wide 
variety of job rights, but also to determine employment rights 
during lay-off, which include the priority list for recalling 
workers, the extablishing of transfer rights, and the oppor­
tunities for ’b u m p i n g ' o t h e r  employees with less seniority. 
Therefore, in view of the above discussion, seniority clauses 
can be seen to constitute a very important part of the collec­
tive agreement,
A fifth section of the collective agreement is 
usually concerned with operating rules and industrial juris­
prudence* This segment of the agreement outlines the basic 
rules that govern the conduct of a plant and set forth the 
punishment that can be expected in case of an infraction of 
these rules. Also included in this section are clauses 
pertaining to the necessity for, and the mutual advantage of, 
maintaining safe and healthy working conditions.
Negotiations of contracts in this area rarely raise 
serious or basic problemsi The disputes arising out of this 
section usually occur after the contract has been signed in 
respect to methods and intent of the parties. Settlement of 
these disagreements is usually obtained through participation 
of both sides in the grievance procedure. In most cases, if 
an agreement cannot be concluded, the matter must be referred
36 Bumping refers to the procedure which allows one employee, 
if he is qualified, to request and to obtain the job of 
another employee who has less seniority.
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to an impartial arbitrator.
The contractual grievance procedure is the usual 
way of settling differences arising out of a 
collective agreement,0oIn broad outline, grievance 
procedures have been largely standardized.,.though 
in detail, considerable variation still exists.
The provisions which set out the various proce­
dural stages are usually very detailed. Normally
they provide for a succession of steps through
which complaints may be processed from lower to 
higher echelons in the management and union 
hierarchy. In the case of grievances that cannot 
be resolved at any one of the steps by the parties 
themselves, reference to an arbitration jointly 
chosen by the parties, is usually provided for, 
as the last step.3'
The arbitrator does not have any authority to alter the 
agreement; he simply interprets it and both sides must abide by 
his decision.
The collective agreement is not a contract in the strict 
sense, but in specific situations it can legally bind the parties
to follow a prescribed course of behavior in their relationships
with one another.3® As a result, the negotiations leading up to
37________________ ,"Labour Leglislation and Collective Bargaining
in the America's," International Labour Review, vol. 84- 
(October, 19&1), p.' 285.
3® In Canada, the legal status of the collective agreement was 
recognized in the 1 9 ^  Wartime Labour Relations, P.C. 1003, 
and this principle has been extended In both federal and 
provincial statutes since that time. Canada is unique in the 
fact that during the lifetime of a collective agreement, disputes 
over its application must be settled by arbitration with the 
strike and lockout explicitly banned; this compulsory arbitration 
based on the content of the collective agreement, implies that 
the agreement is a lpgal contract. The Ontario Labour Relations 
A c t , R.S.O. i960, C.C-Section 37, readsi A collective agreement 
is...binding upon the employer and upon the trade union that is 
a party to the agreement...and upon the employees in the bargai­
ning unit defined in the agreement. For a thorough discussion 
on this point see C.H. Curtis, The Enforcement of the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement, Kingston, Ontario» Industrial Relations 
Centre, Queen's University, 1967, pp. 1-3* For an argument 
against this type of compulsory settlement, see Stanley A.
Little, "Union or Association Objectives: A Labour Viewpoint",
Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: Theory and Practice, 
Kenneth 0. Warner (ed.), Chicago, Illinois: Public Personnel
Association, 1967, p. 55*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-  3 1  -
the collective agreement are often drawn out, and tend to become 
quite tedious, as both sides are careful to ensure that they 
receive their basic requests while not becoming a partner to 
any disadvantageous provisions that would bind them for the 
length of the contract. A great deal of attention is given to 
the language in which the terms are phrased, and usually the 
document is constructed or reviewed by a team of attorneys 
before it is signed. It is not surprising therefore, that the 
negotiations often break down. When this occurs, one, or all, 
of three techniques can be employed to bring about a meeting 
of minds of the participants in the labour dispute; these are 
mediation, conciliation and arbitration.
Mediation occurs when a neutral party is appointed^ 
to act as a go between. When negotiations break down and the 
two parties refuse to meet at the negotiating table, a neutral 
mediator can play a very important role. His most important 
function and his first concern, is to discover some common 
area in which the combatants may resume negotiations. To this 
end, the mediator often arranges to meet privately with each 
party to determine the true bargaining position of each, which 
for strategic reasons, they would not want to reveal fully to 
the other side. These private meetings usually show him how 
far the two sides really are from settlement, and from this 
understanding, he is able to map out his future strategy. This
39 Mediators are usually appointed by a neutral government body. 
In the United States, they are usually made by the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service, and in Canada, by the 
Department of Labour, at either the Federal or provincial 
level depending on the nature of the industry.
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plan of action may involve suggesting proposals for settlement, 
but usually not with the expectation that the parties will 
adopt the recommendations, but in the hope that the proposals 
will suggest a new line of approach which will stimulate the 
resumption of bargaining.
Conciliation takes place when the two antagonists 
meet with each other in the presence of a conciliation board^ 
in an attempt to reach an agreement. Conciliation does not 
imply compulsion} the disputants are not required by law to 
consent to the proposals of a conciliation board; they are 
merely required to wait before they take any remedial action 
against the lack of agreement "until an attempt has been made 
to effect an agreement with the assistance of a conciliation 
officer and conciliation board, and fourteen days has elapsed 
after the conciliation board reported to the Minister of Labour".
In -'theory the process of conciliation simply encourages the manage­
ment and the bargaining agent to use reason instead of force.
"Men of good will can reach an agreement, particularly when the 
commonwealth is endangered; given the place and opportunity, they
h o
will employ intelligence rather than belligerence."^
The Conciliation Board is usually appointed by the appropriate 
Labour Relations Board, and it usually consists of three 
members, one nominated by labour, one by management, and the 
third a neutral nominee, usually the chairman, appointed 
either by the other two nominees, or by the Minister of 
Labour.
If, i
Woods and Ostry, op.cit., p. 80.
U p
Trotta, op.cit., p. 89*
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Compulsory arbitration, unlike conciliation, implies 
compulsion. The two sides are bound by the decision of a neutral 
arbitrator. However, this practice is not sanctioned in law 
in the private sector, nor has it obtained much popularity in 
collective agreements. Collective bargaining is basically a 
two-party relationship and therefore, it is only logical that 
the final decision will result from direct discussion between 
these two sides.^3
This concludes the discussion of collective bargaining 
as it exists in the private sector. What needs to be done now
In holding the view that compulsory arbitration is not a 
suitable means to settle disputes, I am accepting labour's 
claims that the strike is a basic right of all employees 
and an essential component of the bargaining process.
However, an eloquent argument for compulsory arbitration 
is set out by Professor O.W. Phelps, "Compulsory Arbitrations 
Some Perspectives", Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 
vol. 18 (October, 1964), p. 81 and I feel that his remarks 
on this topic are worth reproducing.
Over the years, the case against compulsory 
arbitration of labour disputes has been argued with such 
skill and conviction that the brief for the defense seems 
to have been lost. Quite apart from the merits, this is 
a curious development in a community where the compulsory 
arbitration of other types of dispute is considered an 
ornament of a free society. If a neighbour commits a 
trespass, or a business associate fails to honour his 
contract, he is hauled before a magistrate and the matter 
compulsorily arbitrated rather than settled by force of 
arms. Even in the difficult and delicate area of domestic 
relations, questions of child custody and separate mainte­
nance may be brought to compulsory arbitration at the option 
of an agrieved party. Our whole system of jurisprudence 
relies on the idea that anyone with a grievance is able to 
compel an antagonist to meet him peaceably at a public 
hearing where, after argument, a binding third-party 
settlement is handed down. No one apologizes for this; 
more often than not, the courts are referred to as protectors 
of our liberties, defenders of freedom. The unanimity with 
which it has been held that labour disputes must be exempted 
from this process is remarkable in itself.
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is to extract from this complex process its basic framework in h 
order that it can he applied to the American and the Canadian s "'u 
public sector. The application of the basic framework of1 
collective bargaining to the structured forms of bargaining 
that exist in these public sectors will be done with a view to 
verifying the thesis that the duplication of this framework 
is essential for stability.
Collective bargaining is a two-party relationship; 
the two sides, one representing management and the other labour, 
meet and discuss in a meaningful fashion all the important 
matters affecting the relationship that exists between them.
In the case of an impasse between the two, either during the 
negotiations of a contract or arising from its interruption 
or application there exists a structured method through which  ^
a resolution can be reached. The end result of the process is f 1
a written agreement which is designed to govern the conduct ro
of both management and labour over a given period of time.
The above is the basic framework of collective 
bargaining; it is simple but it embodies all the important 
aspects of the process. Consequently it becomes a useful tool 
which can be used to analyze the Canadian and American experiences 
with collective bargaining in the public sector.
However, before initiating a discussion on this point 
it is necessary to first demonstrate that some type of bilateral 
negotiations are necessary in the conduct of personnel relations 
in the public sector before a claim can be made that implemen­
tation of the bargaining framework is the most conducive to
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stability. To demonstrate the necessity of bilateral negotiations 
no reliance will be made on philosophical arguments, rather it 
will be demonstrated by the Canadian historical example that the 
introduction of this type of relationship was the result of an 
evolutionary process.
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CHAPTER II
The Trend Towards Bilateral Negotiations in Canada
In February 196? legislation was passed which set up 
a framework of collective bargaining in the federal public 
service. This chapter will attempt to assess in an historical 
context the Influences and the pressures which ultimately 
resulted in this policy decision.
In Canada, Federal public servants have always enjoyed 
the rights to both organize staff associations, and then to 
make collective representation to the government.These rights 
have rarely been challenged, by the executive, and when they have 
been questioned, the queries have been interpreted not as attacks 
on staff organizations as such, but rather to any extension of 
their power. An example of this type of attack can be seen in 
a statement by Sir George E. Foster when he was acting Prime 
Minister in 1920. His remarks made in the wake of the 1919 
Winnipeg Strike were concerned with the right of employee orga­
nizations. He stated that, although the right to organize was 
already recognized as applying to industrial workers, "the 
principle could not be applied to Government employees, who were
Legislation on the subject of Collective Bargaining in the 
public sector consisted of three Acts, "The Public Service 
Staff Relations Act", An Act Respecting Employee Relations 
in the Public Service of Canada, s".C. (1967) c. 72; "The 
Public Service Employment Act", An Act Respecting Employment 
in the Public Service of Canada, S.C., (19&7)\ c7~7l] 5ncT 
An Act to Amend the Financial Administration Act, S.Co,
71967). c. 7k,
^ Kenneth 0. Warner and Mary L. Hennessey, Public Management 
at the Bargaining Table, Chicago: Public Personnel
Association, 19^7> P» 36.
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obviously in a different category".3 However, when one takes 
into account the fact that as early as the late nineteenth 
century, the federal employees' associations had begun some 
sporadic organizational activity, and that by the time of 
Poster's speech in 1920, a number of them were already firmly 
established,^ his denial of the right of public servants to 
organize, had little relevance. That is unless his words are 
interpreted to take in the broader scope of trade union 
activities, which include collective bargaining and strike 
action.
The right to group together can be considered, there­
fore, an inherent right of our public services. But organi­
zation by itself is of no real importance if the representatives 
of the group are denied a responsive ear to which they can voice 
their needs and desires. The lack of such responsiveness on 
the part of the government to the requests of the association, 
plagued the public service for most of this century, as the
3 ________________ , "Notes on Current Matters of Industrial.
Interest*1,The Labour Gazette, vol. 20 (April, 1920), p, 372.
k
The Federal Civil Servants Association that date their 
origin prior to 1920 ares The Railway Mail Clerks 
Association in 1889; the Federated Association of Letter 
Carriers in 1891; the Civil Service Association of Ottawa 
in 1907; the Association of Canadian Postal Workers in 
1911; and the Dominion Mail Clerks Association in 1917.
For a discussion of these early organizations, see Robert 
A. Vaison, "Collective Bargaining in the Federal Public 
Service: The Achievement of a Milestone in Personnel
Relations", C.P.A., vol. XII, (Spring, 1969), pp. 108-112. 
For a discussion of the environment from which these 
organizations evolved, see P.M. Daw-on, The Civil Service 
of Canada, London: Humphrey Mil.ford, 1929*
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development of regularized relations, even on a basis of limited 
reciprocity, were slow in maturing* For example, after the 
formation of the two postal organizations in the 1890’s, a letter 
was sent to the Postmaster-General requesting a meeting at 
which they could discuss improvements in their pay and working 
conditions. But even though the postal workers had not received 
a pay increase in 32 years, and thus had good reason to request 
such a meeting "the Postmaster-General replied that he had no 
intention of wasting his time meeting with dissident groups of 
employees’,’ .5
The public servant has always enjoyed the right to 
petition the Crown, but the Sovereign authority for a long 
time did not consider it necessary, or even proper, to consult 
with its servants on matters affecting their conditions for 
employment. Representatives of the various staff organizations 
were invited periodically to submit briefs before the various 
committees which were established to study the public service, 
but they were not permitted to participate in the deliberations 
or to be a party to its reports and recommendations.6 The 
Government felt that since it alone was responsible to parlia­
ment for all governmental activity this precluded the type of 
employer-employee relationship which was beginning to evolve 
in the sphere of private labour relations.?
^ J.F. Maguire, The Public Service Alliance, Approach to
Collective Bargaining, October 1967, an unpublished research 
paper prepared by the Public Service Alliance of Canada.
Saul J. Prankel, Staff Relations in the Civil Service,
Montreal* McGill University Press, 1962, p. 51«
7 For a discussion of the development of employer-employee
relations in the private sector, see Woods, on.cit., pp. 39-86.
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This attitude on the part of the Government led to the 
Prime Minister and his Cabinet becoming the centre of activity 
as far as the public service associations were concerned. As 
a consequence, the Executive became the goal on which the 
organizations set their sights when they attempted to initiate 
discussions that would lead to favourable changes in employer- 
employee relations. In reviewing the association's briefs, the 
Government usually followed one of three procedures; (i) they 
would give an immediate reply (ii) they would, inform the 
organization that its proposals were under consideration, or, 
(iii) they would request that they submit a more detailed brief 
to the Civil Service Commission or the -Treasury Board. Never­
theless, whatever the procedure, the final decision was not the 
product of direct and detailed, consultations, but was rather 
the unilateral decision of the Government.
The associations were aware of their lack of power 
and authority, but prior to the Second World War, they were 
not in a position to question their inferior statuse Before the 
Civil. Service Act of 1918,® the Public Service had relied to a 
large extent on the patronage system to staff the Government 
departments. As this system does not imply tenure during good 
behaviour, it would, ha.ve been extremely foolish on the part of 
the public servants to rebel, against the men who had appointed 
them to their p o s i t i o n s . ^  An example of how precarious employ­
ment actually was at this time can be seen in the fact that
O
' S.C., 1918, c. 12.
9 See Dawson, op.cit., p. 27.
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"in the three years following the defeat of' the laurier 
Government in 193.1, some 13.,000 civil. servants resigned or 
were removed from office."^ However, with the 3 918 Civil
Service Act, the entire public service, with limited
11 . . . .exceptions, was placed under the supervision of the Civil.
Service Commission. This enhanced the stability of employ­
ment, but before this system was fully able to adjust to the 
new conditions, the country was plunged into a depression.* 
Another reason for the acquiescent attitude of the association 
in the 1920’s was the violent reaction on the part of the
populace to the Winnipeg Strike of 193 9 and all the Communist
1 ?connotations that were associated with labour organizations.
10 R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press,' 196 A, p. 273.
I* The Civil Service Act extended to all government employees 
except those associated with government railways or working 
on government ships. However, the Act did stipulate that 
the Civil Service Commission with the permission of the 
Governor in Council could dispense with, the normal, proce­
dures associated with the merit when it saw fit to do so.
See Statutes of Canada, 1918.
1 ? The intensity of the hostility towards labour organizations
that was prevalent among the populace in the 1920’s can be 
gauged by the newspaper editorials of the day. For exampl.e, 
on June 30, 1919» an editorial in the Globe and Mail said 
"We at least, have no Czar or Kaiser to threaten us with 
Siberia or subdue us with the sword, but who knows what we 
would have under the regime of a rampant and ’00 3 she vised 
Labottr party? ... The pick is no more the sceptre of divine 
right than the sword."; and on May 33» 1921, headlines on 
the front page of the G3-obe read. '’Unionism faces serious 
Strike Danger in Strike Order", and this was foil.owed with 
a sub-headline which read "Communist Agitators all Under 
Surveillance." The red. scare and the effect it had. on the 
public's attitude towards labour, was also brought out in 
the Annual Report of the Department of Labour in 1921,
"large numbers look upon the general, labour movement as an 
overt act of the tendency such as has been witnessed in 
Russia." See Sessional Parer no. 37» 1921, p. 10.
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During the early 1930's, Bennett attempted to solve 
the country's economic ills through the pursuance of a policy 
that depended on cutting government expenditures to balance the 
budget. This, naturally, had a. detrimental effect on the 
public servants, as both their number and their salaries were 
reduced.13 The Government employees realized that this period 
of economic restraint was not compatible with a vociferous 
movement on their part which demanded a greater voice in 
determining their wording conditions and, as a result, they 
tended to be passive during this period. This dormant attitude 
was augmented by the fact that people tend to be more co-opera­
tive during good times, and the public servants, even with
their reduction in pay were, in relation to the majority
1 Uof the society, fairly well off. The outbreak of the 
Second World War, however, terminated both the period of 
economic restraint and the passiveness of the public servants.
i-3 In January 1929, there were *4-2,038 employees in the Federal, 
Service, and they earned a total of $5, **28,058 in that 
month, which was an average of $129.00 per month for each 
employee. By 193*+> "the total number of employees had fall en 
to *4-1,3*4-6 and. they earned a. total of $**,698,536 in the 
month of January, and this was only an average of $113.00 
per month. These figures were obtained from the Canada 
Year Book 193**-35> F« ^99•
1 Ai* *In the manufacturing sector of the economy m  1929> a 
total of $812,0*1-9,8*5-2 was paid to 69**>**3** employees; 
this was an average of approximately $99*00 per month 
for- each employee. In 1-935 tho total number of omployepp 
was only 583> 87** and they earned a total of $590,326,90*4- 
which was an average of $8*1.00 per month. In the civil 
service, the depression resulted, in a reduction of the 
total number of employees of between one and two percent; 
in the manufacturing sector, the decrease was between 16 
and 17 percent. The loss in pay in the private sector 
for the employees who were fortunate enough to hold onto 
their jobs, was about 15 percent. The figures for the 
above calculations were obtained from the Canada Year 
Book 193^-35 and- 19**5*
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In 1916 the British Government had appointed a committee
under the chairmanship of J.H. Whitley to inquire into the
relationship which existed between employers and employees in
the private sector and to make recommendations that would
improve and stabilize the conditions in that sector. This move
was necessitated because industrial unrest was so prevalennt.
For example, during the war years of 1915 and ]..Ql6, more than
four and one half million working days were lost as a result
of strikes*1^ The committee made its first report in 1917
and recommended that joint councils be established which would
negotiate the differences which existed between the two sides.
The report was not meant to include the civil service, but
soon after its publication, the President of the Civil Service
Clerical Alliance began to expound the benefits such a system
would have in the public sphere of employment, and in 193 9
Whitley councils were set up In the public sector on the
national level as well as on the departmental level. The
objectives of these councils were:
To secure the greatest measure of co-operation 
between the State in its capacity as employer, 
and the general body of civil servants in matters 
affecting the Civil Service, with a view to 
increase efficiency in the public service com­
bined with the i boium o-c those emr1 oved; 
to provide machinery ^or desling with grievances, 
and generally to bring together the experiences 
and different points of view of representatives 
of the administrative, clerical and manipulative
15 See Sir William Armstrong, "Whitleyism in the Civil
Service", Whitley Bulletin, vol. XLIX (September/October,
1969), p. 13^
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Civil Service.~6
The councils, which were made up of an equal number’ 
of representatives from the government and the employees, were 
to meet regularly to discuss a wide range of issues which 
concerned the civil service. These included problems concerning 
conditions of employment such as hours of work, leave, and 
allowances. The councils were primarily advisory bodies and 
their recommendations were not considered to be binding, 
although quite often their proposals did become operative.
In order to be in the position to enable it to submit a recom­
mendation to the government, the council had to first reach 
an agreement among its own members; this consensus was not 
achieved by a. majority vote of the entire council, but rather 
through an agreement on the issues by its two component parts, ■ 
the representatives of the employer and of the employees. If 
an agreement could not be reached, the issue remained unresolved 
and the Government had to look to alternative methods to solve 
the problem.^?
The Canadian public servants in the 1920's looked to 
the British example with envious eyes, and to a. degree pressure
16 Richard Hayward, Whitley Councils in the United Kingdom 
Civil Service, published by Civil Service National Whitley 
Council, Staff Side.
17 •For a. more comprehensive study of the Wh.xt.ley Councils see
L.D. White, Whitley Councils in the British Civil Service, 
Chicago! University of Chicago Press, 1933° For a discussion 
of the Councils and their effectiveness, see 'Leo D. Gagan, 
"Recent Transformation in Civil Service Whitleyism", Public 
Personnel Review, vol. 12, (January, 19.51)» PP» 25-30, and 
Sir William Armstrong, "Whitleyism in the Civil Service", 
Whitley Bulletin, vol. XLIX (November, 1969), pp. 151-155®
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was put on the government to .initiate a similar programme in 
Canada.^  In 1926 Mackenzie King utilized this fervour on 
the part of the government employees to gain support in the 
election of that year, when he went on record publicly advo­
cating the establishment of joint-couneiIs;
I think that in the relations of the Civil 
Servi.ce a.nd the Government, a Council on 
which there would be representatives of the 
Civil Service to speak directly to members 
of the Government, or to take up with the 
heads of departments, matters of interest 
to all government departments, would be of 
the utmost service to all concerned* '
After the election, however, King seemed to lose some 
of his fervour concerning national councils and nothing was done 
until 1928 when J.S. Woodsworth introduced a bill in the House 
of Commons which would have authorized the creation of both a 
National Council and Departmental councils. When the bill 
came up for second reading on February 10, 1928, King referred 
the bill to the Committee on Industrial and International 
Relations.^0 The House Committee recommended that the Govern­
ment should establish a committee to draw up a constitution 
for a National Civil Servi.ce Council. The Government followed
18 On April-21, 1922. the Hon. James Murdock, the Minister of 
Labour, admitted to a question by J.S. Woodsworth, that 
"representations had been made to the government for the 
introduction of Whitley Councils". See House of Commons 
Debates, 3.922, p. IO61.
^  Quoted in Taylor Cole, The Canadian Bureaucracy, Durham, 
N.C.i Duke University Press', 19^9/' p. 12.4".
See House of Commons Debates, 1928, p. 362.
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this recommendation, and in May of I93O Order in Council number 
970 established a committee to draft a constitution for such 
a council.
But an election preceded the first meeting- of this 
committee; Mackenzie King was defeated by Bennett, and although 
the new Prime Minister did not repeal the Order in Council, he 
allowed it. to remain inactive. King's return to office in 3.935 
did not enhance the situation, as the Order continued to remain 
far down the list of priorities; but with the advent of the war 
and the resulting proliferation of public servants the issue 
could no longer be ignored.
On February 24, 1Q^+, the Minister of Finance, Hon. J.L.
Ilsley, announced in the House of Commons that the Treasury Board
had decided to establish an "employer-employee council in the
public service in Canada modelled after the pattern which had
evolved in the United Kingdom through the application of so-called
9 9Whitley Councils, to the British Public Service','. The final, 
constitution of this council was embodied in a Treasury Board 
Minute in March 19^5« If provided for a total of eighteen 
members, eight representing the official side, and ten repre­
senting the staff side; it also all.owed for recommendations to 
be made to the Treasury Board, the Civil. Service Commission, 
nr the Governor in Council. However, Finance Minister Ilsley 
was emphatic when he stated that "the Council will of course 
have no executive powers which would impair the responsibility
^  In March of 1935» there were 40,792 pwople employed in the 
Federal Service; by March 1Q^1» this figure had mushroomed 
to 112,658. Canada Year Book, 19^5•
House of Commons Debates, 19^l» p* 7?8.
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of the Cabinet, or Treasury Board or Civil Service Commission, 
or possibly infringe upon the authority of Parliament'.' *^3 But 
even this pronouncement could not dampen the spirits of the 
public servants, who for the first time had a forum in which 
they could "discuss and consider jointly with officials repre­
senting the Government as employer, a wide range of questions
2 k
affecting their conditions of work"*
The concept of joint councils was expanded in 19^ -8 
with the creation of departmental councils, and it appeared 
that there would finally b^ v‘nsponsible v-,'vtoT1 ,)'^ioni, h ^ -^n 
^mrl end pnm"1 ovee at all 1 ©vd s in the Federal Administrati on.. .. - •' _i ' -j " ' " "  • • - * -
But the employees' high hopes in these joint Councils soon 
dwindled* This came about due to a number of factors: the
Government appeared to put little weight on the activities of 
these organizations? the constant bickering between the various 
Staff Associations weakened the employees' position; and, the 
central question concerning salaries and wages could not be 
discussed by the C o u n c i l . A s  a result, the latter part of 
the 19 kO' s and early 1950* s witnessed an increasing amount, of 
dialogue on the part of the public servants and their Association
83
Cole, op.cit*, p. 12o.
2k
Heeney Report, Personnel. Administration in the Public Service, 
Queen's Printer^ 1 Reprint 1980, Appendix '"B" Joint Consul- 
tation Between Government and Employees Pay and Conditions 
of V/ork.
25
For a discussion of these points, See Cole op.cit.,, p0 128.
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concerning the feasibility of collective ‘bargaining.'''0
However, in the late 19^0’s and early 1950*3, the 
prevailing opinion in Canada, although under an increasing 
amount of pressure, was still that there was no bargaining 
with the Crown; this was not only the official point of view, 
but to a large degree also that of the employers. One reason 
for this lacklustre approach towards collective bargaining was 
that the labour movement was still involved primarily with 
industry "and it took some time before the labour leaders 
realized that the growing tertiary, or servi.ce sector, would 
be an interesting cl ientelle".2 ^ As a. result, the Staff 
Associations, operating in a void of pressure from outside 
labour forces, were neither competent nor strong enough by 
themselves to undertake such a movement. Another important 
factor was that at this time, unions were primarily associated 
with blue-collar workers, and the white-co]lar attitudes of 
the public servants tended to regard any associations on their 
part with unionism, or any of the connotations attached to it, 
as degrading to their station. The last major cause of the 
hesitancy of the public servants towards demanding the extension 
of bargaining activity to their sector, can be attributed to the
26 on November 26, 1953, Mr. Claude Ellis brought up in the 
House of Commons the question of the extension of bargaining 
rights to civil servants: "I think the time has oomo in 
this country when we should recognize that there is a 
better method of carrying on employer«employee relations.
We have got beyond the concept of master and servant ..."
See the House of Commons Debates 1953* P» 332-> The unrest 
in the Civil Service was also brought out in an article by 
0. Glenn Stahl, "The Horizon of Personnel Administration". 
Public Personnel Review, vol. 13, (July, 1952)> P* -106.
27 Bolduc, op.clt., p. 13*
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fact that the government employees at this time had frown up 
and had been educated during the depress.! on and the Second 
World War and, as a consequence, they knew what hard times 
meant and they did not want another conflict, this time with 
their employers® But as the fifties drew to a close "many 
forces that were latent, or that had worked in isolated fashion,
p Q
gained impetus", and a concentrated effort aimed at the
attainment of collective bargaining was launched.
By the late 1950's, discontent was .growing at an
unprecedented rate in the public service. '^9
"The demand (for change) had developed slowly 
during the postwar period. When the Industrial 
Relations and Disputes Investigation Act was 
passed in 19^8 there was no apparent desire on 
the part of the P u b l i c  Service employer organiza­
tions to have their relationship with the Govern­
ment regulated by the legislation. Within a few 
years it was being argued by some associations 
that the Public Service should be brought within
0  g) B "h O  t  ^ ^  ^ Vj (1 "’o y 4* ’Ip 0  C1 fn 'fclin T- wl rh r n i’,n » ^
r\ o p l  1  / ' p  +  T t r c  o  y > r r o  ^ - p  p p? p  i f  0  1 Hi  T * ^  0 1 1  ^  r ' 0  ^  r v T " ' P ( H
^  lb id., p. 13*
2 9 The unrest in the public sector in this period can be measured 
by a number of factors: by the merger of the Amalgamated and
the Civil Service Association of Ottawa in 1958; by the appoint 
ment of a Pay Research Bureau in 19575 by the appointment of a 
Committee to study the public service; by the numerous announce 
ments in the House of Commons; by the opposition, advocating 
the extension of collective bargaining to the public sec tor •> I 
example of this last point can be seen in a speech by Mr. Bodan 
in the House of Commons on May id, 1959! " I si.ig.gost the
Minister of Labour should, recommend to his cabinet colleagues 
that the time has come to place all workers or the civil 
service below the executive rank, on the same footing as 
workers who are employed in industry, and that they be given 
the same bargaining rights as any other group", see House 
of Commons Debates, 1959> P» 3868.
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specifically for the Public Service would be 
pref erable. "30
The introduction of the National. Joint Councils had 
placated the public service temporarily, and the formation of 
the Pay Research Bureau in 1957^ which was instituted in an 
effort to affect one of the major shortcomings of the Councils, 
also hah a tempering effect, but the problems which existed in 
the Civil Service went far deeper than either of these two 
bodies could hope to reach.
For approximately forty years government employees 
had been forced to live with the then present Civil Service 
Act, despite the fact that during this per? od Canada had experienced 
momentous changes which had a great effect on the National Public 
Servi.ce.
Population had more than doubled. The immense 
expansion of commerce and industry throughout 
the nation had been accompanied by significant 
developments in labour-management relations...
During this period, too, Canadians had evolved 
their own concepts of the responsibility of
the state f o r  the welfare of i.ts citizens.-^
But these extensive changes had little effect on the public
service; the public servants continued to work under the weak
and vague provisions outlined by the 1916 Civil Service Act
even though it was "legally deficient in making provisions for
30 Rerort of the Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargain?ny 
in the Public Service, July 1965, P« K ”*
3^ See ibid., p. 1? for a limited discussion on this bureau»
32 The Civil Service Commission’s Report "Personnel Administration 
in the Public Service", quoted in Canadian Public Administration, 
edited by Hodgetts and Corbett, Toronto's Macmillan Company,
I960, p.’ 268.
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many of the so-called fringe benefits provided by good employers
today” The Government, realizing this unrest, instructed
the Civil Service Commission to "review the Civil Service Act
and regulations and examine the role of the Commission in the
machinery of government".3^
The Keeney Commission35 conducted a detailed study and,
as result of its investigation, made a number of recommendations.
There have been a number of statements ma.de concerning these
proposals, but none as appropriate as one by J.C. B e s t . 36
Unlike good wine, the document known as 
Personnel Administration in the Public Service, 
has not improved with age. When first intro­
duced early in 1959 the Report was acclaimed by 
the newspapers and others as being the fore­
runner of a new Bill of Rights for Civil 
Servants, and the gateway to the best of all 
possible worlds. Today, some fourteen months 
later, there are many of us who look at the 
report with considerable misgivings.'''
Appendix "B" of the Heeney Commission has been the
target of most of the criticism levelled at it. This section
33 Harold Bowen, "The Heeney Report", Collective Bargaining in 
the Public Service, Fredericton, N.B.s Canadian Labour 
Congress, 1960, p7 1.
35-
The Civil Service Commission Report, Hodgetts and Corbett: 
op.clt., p. 26d.
35 The correct name for the Heeney Report is the Report of the 
Civil Service Commission of Canada on Personnel Administration 
in the Public Service. Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1956, 
(reprinted i960).
3d Mr. Best was, at that time, President of the Civil Service 
Association of Canada.
33 J.C. Best, "The Heeney Report", Collective Bargaining in 
the Public Service, Fredericton, N.B.; Canadian Labour 
Congress,iQoO, p7 1.
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recommended that on matters other than salaries and wages, the 
National Joint Council should he the forum for discussion and 
the body that should forward all recommendations direct1y to 
the government. As far as wages and salaries were concerned, 
the Report recommended that machinery he set up for joint 
consultation between the ”representntivras c ’7’ government
H  "fhl O () p !:i V, p  s-n '-'i •-*> rl M'V) o  i r * r \^ n vio n  O  IT tt* O  c v ‘j r'v' i 7 p(*] q -f-rj p-P
associations on the other"-^ i,n order that th^y "could discuss
in systematic fashion, questions of salary and wages in govern
ment employment!-'*39 These meetings, the report suggested,
would he chaired by an officer of the Civil Service Commission
and after frank discussions between the two sides, the Civil
Service Commission would make its recommendations to the
Government, and forward a. copy of its proposals to the Staff
Associations*^0
This section attracted the hulk of the criticism due
to the fact that it did not deal with the problems concerning
salaries and wages in a realistic fashion.
"The type of collective consultation which the 
three commissioners recommended, was one in 
which the Civil Service Commission would sit at 
the end of a table in a somewhat detached capa­
city, the representatives of the civil service 
organizations and associations would sit on one 
side, and representatives of the Treasury Board 
would sit on the other, and there would be 
discussions. "
38 ^ Heeney Report, Appendix "B", op.cit., paragraph 7*
39 Ibid., paragraph ?•
Ibid., paragraphs 8, 9> 10.
Al' Hon. Donald. M. Fleming, House of Commons Debates, 19bO-6l » 
t>. 3879.
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The inadequacies of this proposal were brought out
clearly by a Member of Parliament when he stated:
I have not been impressed with the provisions 
of Appendix B of the Heeney Report. It is naive 
in its assumptions and to my Tinders tan ding, 
it completely ignores the legitimate aspirations 
of the employee. It has all the weaknesses of 
a unilateral compromise In that it fails 
completely to appreciate the need for partici­
pation in employment matters that now exists.
It is too much conerned with maintaining out­
moded traditional concepts that are useless 
in i960. ^
The inadequacy of the recommendations set forth were 
apparent even before the report was published. In May 195'°’> 
the Pay Research Bureau submitted a brief to the Treasury 
Board; this report was followed by joint consultations between: 
the three main Staff Associations and members of the Treasury 
Board and senior Government officials. These consultations 
were chaired by a Civil Service Commissioner. Each party 
involved was given an opportunity to state its case and, in 
addition, time was allowed for informal arguments by individuals. 
These meetings were followed by the Civil Service Commission 
presenting to the Government, its recommendations for a salary 
revision to be effective October 1, 1958. The above procedure 
was identical with the one outlined in the Heeney Report except 
for the fact that the Staff Associations were not supplied 
with a copy of the commissioner's recommendations. The result 
of these responsible discussions was that the government not 
only turned down the recommendations, but even refused to make 
them public. Civil Servants across the country were shocked by
^  Quoted in Best, op.cit., p. 2.
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this treatment, and demands were made to the Central offices of 
the Staff Associations, demanding some type of action„ The 
Staff Associations petitioned the Minister of Labour and 
"expressed themselves quite forcibly on the subject and indi­
cated that this kind of system did not meet with their views". '^3 
The organizations also responded to this pressure from their
rp ojrV' pv.n.j^ ^  -v", rj 3 ^  <r m I -*'')^ * O  'i ^  f) ’' r5 r"* ^  ^  I P  G  T)**'*' 3 ^  C  9 "O ^ °
ties across the country, in an attempt to educate the public 
on the seriousness of the situation.^ They also initiated a 
Joint Action Committee in 1959* the aim of this body was to 
co-ordinate activity among the various staff associations in 
order that they could have a united front. '^5
The Government reacted to this crowing discontent by 
introducing a bill in i960 which would have revised the Civil 
Service Act. However, at the request of several groups who 
wanted more time to study it, the Government, withdrew the 
motion,^ In 1961 it re-introduced it* The Bill C-71 wa.s
d-3 House of Commons Debates, op.cit.
kk
Bolduc, op.cit,, p. Ik,
£1 Report of the Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining 
op.cit., p. l£.
^  Mr. Caron, a Liberal Member of Parliament, was instrumental 
in obtaining the delay in the legislation. The government 
was attempting to push a. Civil Servi.ce Act through in the 
latter part of the session and Mr. Caron attacked this move 
in the House of Commons. "He, (Minister of Finance will not 
even a],low civil servants and civil service organizations 
enough time to give it (Civil Service Act) ad equate consi­
deration, or give them an opportunity to appear before the 
committee and make recommendation." House of Commons 
Debates, June 20, i960, p. 5-13?.*
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to become the Givi]. Service Act of 3 96.I0 The bill woe referred 
to the House of Commons Special Committee on the Civil Service 
Act and the employee organisations were invited to present 
briefs. "Most of them wanted direct negotiations with the 
Government. Eschewing the strike, they were in favour of 
settling disputes by arbitration."^? However, the briefs by 
these organizations were not well presented and often conflicted 
with each other. These slip-shod presentations demonstrated to 
the House Committee the fact "that the staff associations had 
not really thought through the implications of full.-blown 
collective bargaining and it was not what most of them wanted".^8 
As a result, the Government was able to take a firm position 
and the new Civil Service Act received Royal Assent with provisions 
for consultations only, with the Staff Organizations.
These provisions, however, proved, only to be a. stop­
gap measure, as the Staff Associations soon discovered that 
their right to consult with the Civil Service Commission and 
with senior personnel designated by the Minister of Finance, 
was not very practical, because although they could consult all 
they wanted to, it was the Government, in the final analysis, 
which made the decisions. As a result, the Staff Associations 
once again began to press for collective bargaining. In 3.963, 
for example, they formulated the Staff Side Council for Collective
U-?
Robert Armstrong, "Some Aspects of Policy Determination 
in the Development of the Collective 'Bargaining Legislation 
in the Public Service of Canada", Canadian Public 
Adm.in 1 strati0n , vol. XI (Winter, I96S ), pp. AS'5-^93♦
1+8 Ibid., p. ^87.
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Bargaining in the Public Service* The breaking point in their 
fight came just prior to the IQ63 election, when C.A. Edwards,
the President of the Civil Service Federation of Canada, took 
the Initiative and wrote the leaders of Canada's national 
political parties asking them to clarify the official position 
of their respective parties "on the quest] on of the principle 
of negotiation and arbitration for the civil service and the 
specific proposals of the Civil Service Federation for a 
negotiation procedure in the civil service" The responses 
of the parties were generally favourable towards the introduction 
of some type of bargaining.-’
With the Liberal victory in 19^3, Mr* Pearson acted 
swiftly to honour the cause he had committed his party to, 
prior to the election. He established a preparatory committee 
on collective bargaining in August 1963, with Arno]d Heeney as 
Chairman. The task of this committee was to "make preparations 
for the introduction into the Public Service of an appropriate 
form of collective bargaining and arbitration, and to examine 
the need for reforms in the system of classification and pay 
applying to civil servants and prevailing rate employees".5^
^9 Ibid., p* d-88*
50 This outright request to the leaders of the political 
parties for their position on oollootiv/' h.>•■!•►>■■-nuing
•! L o p ]  i p  o r '  ■’ v '*/''1 C  1 ~*r 1 ]  C  ^  V1 h o p  f l . i l  r *  o  ’h h  p v  C O ] ' " *
not afford to c.li enate over ld-0,000 voters during; an 
election campaign. As a result, their responses were 
favourable towards the concept of collective bargaining.
Preparatory Committee, op.cit., p. 1.
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The preparatory committee consulted with the various 
staff associations and also a number of trade uni ons before it 
made its report in July, 1965° In this report it proposed a 
structural method of collective bargaining in the Federal Servic 
similar to that existing in private industry. As in the private 
sector, it suggested that bargaining should be a two party- 
process; the Treasury Board, it proposed, should be considered 
the employer in all negotiations to facilitate the process, 
while the bargaining agents on the other hand, would represent 
bargaining units established in relation to classes or groups 
of employees to whom a pay plan applied; sixty-six such bargai- 
nkng units were recommended,5^ The committee also proposed 
binding arbitration on the employers, but reserved to the 
government the right to reject an award when the national 
interest was at stake. The Preparatory Committee, however, 
did not specifically condemn strike action and a group of 
militant postal workers took advantage of this and went on a 
strike, July 18, 1965, shortly after the report was issued to 
back up their demands to the Government,
The Government reacted to this by requesting that a ID. 
interested parties submit briefs to them concerning the proposal 
of the Preparatory Committee. This resulted in approximately 
75 amendments to the proposed 1egislation suggested by the 
Preparatory Committee, The two mo a i. important cbangoc brought 
about by this review of the Preparatory Committee recommendation 
were the means to review conflict resolution and the power of 
reservation which the Committee had given to the Government.
52 gee Appendix A for a discussion of the reclassification 
system.
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These changes which were instituted at this time, especially 
the clause to allow strike action, can he seen as important 
policy decisions which were made at the discretion oT the 
executive branch of Government.
The final draft of the bill introduced into Parliament 
was tailored to meet the aim of the legislation as defined by 
the Government, which was "to preserve the capacity of the 
public service to function efficiently in serving the people
of Canada"
Various pressures, including the environment as 
prescribed by established norms and economic conditions, the 
needs and aspirations of the public servants and their organi­
zations, public opinion, the activities of the opposition 
parties and interested groups, and the goals of government, 
as pointed out in the above discussion, all played a vital 
role in setting the stage for the legislation# By 1966 the time 
was ripe for government action. The result was legislation 
which culminated the trends which had been present in the society 
since the turn of the century. The course of action the govern­
ment could pursue was clearly defined.. It could have possibly 
introduced piecemeal legislation to placate the public servants 
but it would only have been a temporary measure. The various 
pressures in society demanded the introduction of’ meaningful 
bilateral negotiations and the policy alternatives of the 
executive by 1966 were extremely limited. The time was ripe; 
it had be ripened by the historical process outlin ed above, and 
the government merely consummated, this trend.
53 Lester Pearson, Debates, August 1963# p«
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Chapter III
Collective Bargaining in the American Public Sector
Prom the discussion in the previous chapter it appears 
as though the road to bilateral negotiations was an evo­
lutionary one in the field of labour-management relations 
in the public sector. In Canada, employee organizations 
have been actively engaged in eroding the once powerful 
position of the sovereign power since before the turn of 
the century. Today this erosion has reached the extent 
that the Canadian Government, like most other modern govern­
ments, has agreed to limit its sovereignty by engaging in 
some type of collective bargaining activity. This move 
towards bilateral negotiations, however, was not only pre­
cipitated through the pressures exerted by the employee 
organizations but also through a realization on the part 
of management that stability could be better achieved by 
introducing into the staff relations area a structured 
form of negotiations. It realized that negotiations would 
allow for the utilization of the knowledge and the genius 
of the employees while at the same time providing an open 
line of communications that would allow management to stay 
abreast of discontent and alienation in order that it 
could formulate appropriate policies before a disruption 
occurred.
Negotiations, therefore, have a very important role 
in staff relations in the public sector. But what line 
should these negotiations follow and within what boundaries 
should they be conducted? It is my hypothesis, as pointed
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out in the introduction, that in order to have negotiations 
that do in fact help to create stability it is necessary 
to embody the basic framework of collective bargaining into 
the public sector context. This is not to say that there 
has to be a wholesale transplant of the practices and pro­
cesses discussed in chapter IIj only that the basic inter­
actions of the process must be reproduced if the beneficial 
aspects of the system are to be transferred to the public 
sector. Stability can only be achieved in the public 
sector through a well structured process of bilateral 
negotiations, and since this process was developed in the 
private sector within a collective bargaining framework, 
with a large measure of success, it stands to reason that 
the basic framework of collective bargaining should be put 
to work in the public sector. Once this model of bargaining 
is transplanted it will develop and foster its own out­
growths and trappings which will be compatible to the 
public environment.
In order to show the validity of this thesis, I will 
discuss the American and Canadian experiences with bilateral 
negotiations in the public sector at the federal level. My 
discussion of the experiences of these two countries in 
this field will show that the successes and failures of 
these experiments are directly related to the degree that 
they have embodied or failed to embody the basic framework 
of collective bargaining.
But before I apply the outline developed in chapter I 
to the American situation it would be useful to first give 
a brief history of staff relations in the American civil
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service to bolster the claim made in chapter II that the 
introduction of collective bargaining was an evolutionary 
process*
In August, 1912, the Lloyd-La Follette Act was passed
and it established the right of persons employed in the
civil service of the United States, "either individually
or collectively, to petition Congress or any member thereof,
or to furnish information to either House of Congress or
1
to any committee or member thereof". This act was relatively 
progressive for its day as it provided for both the right 
of the federal employee to be heard by his employer and 
his right to join employee organizations. It did not, 
however, grant the employee organizations any rights of 
their own which were distinct from those of individual 
employees; consequently, the ability of these organizations 
to represent their members did not rest on any rights 
granted to them by a legislative body but rather on the 
degree of sufferance they received from the various 
departments.
Meaningful negotiations2 were therefore impossible 
in this type of environment. As argued above it is impe­
rative that negotiations take place in a bilateral 
setting, and as long as the government did not recognize
1 Lloyd-La Follette Act, 37 Stat. 555* quoted in Hart, 
op.cit., p. 33*
2 Meaningful negotiations is a technical term which implies 
that negotiations cover all the important aspects of 
employer-employee relations. A discussion of the scope 
of the relationships which are incorporated in the 
meaning of this term is given in chapter I, pp. 24-29.
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the employee organizations as instruments of negotiation, 
regularized patterns of staff relations "based on criteria 
other than paternalism and unilateralism were not possible. 
The employees in the federal civil service realized this, 
and as a consequence sought enactment of legislation that 
would amend the Lloyd-La Follette Act "in order to provide 
more effective statutory recognition of organizations of 
federal employees".^ For example, during the period 
between 19^9 and 1961 approximately eighty bills were 
introduced in Congress on the subject of union recognition.^ 
Although a number of these bills were favourably reported 
by the House and Senate committees they were never brought 
to a vote in either House of Congress.
The inability of the supporters of these bills to 
bring them to a vote was due primarily to a number of 
preconceived notions held in the Congress and in the nation 
at large. These widespread misconceptions of government 
employment were that (1) public employees were so well 
taken care of by the governmental parent they served that 
they did not need to band together to achieve better 
working conditions! (2) collective bargaining was not 
shown to be as necessary in public employment as it was in
3 W.B. Vosloo, Collective Bargaining in the United States 
Federal Civil Service, Cornell University, Ph.D. 19^5> 
University Microfilms Inc., p. 80.
^ The two chief exponents in Congress of this drive for 
union recognition were Representative George M. Rhodes 
of Pennsylvaniz (D) and Senator Olin D. Johnston of 
South Carolina (D).
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private industrial life because the public environment was 
sheltered, to a large degree, from the market influences 
that played havoc on employment conditions and standards 
in the private sector;^ (3) the state was considered to 
be a sovereign power, a sort of transcendental unique 
force that would be threatened by any comparison with
private institutions especially private employment and its
£
practices*
However, these notions of government employment were 
extremely unrealistic as they ignored the fact that since 
the war the government had been faced with an ever increasing 
demand load from the civil service. But the increase in 
the number of demands was not the only new post-war charac­
teristic of the civil service; the methods by which the 
employees sought to achieve their ends, including greater 
militancy and persistency, was also new.? The government, 
in order to combat these new demands and techniques, went 
on the defensive. Instead of trying to introduce new pro­
grammes and techniques that would dispel the old notions 
of government employment and which would establish a new
5 For a discussion of market influences and the public 
sector see Gordon T. Nesvig, "The New Dimension of the 
Strike Question", Public Administration Review, vol. 28 
(April, 1968), pp. 130-131.
6 For a discussion of why public employees were excluded 
from participation in labour policies that had evolved 
in private industry see Ida Klaus, "Past, Present and 
Some Prognostications", Personnel Report. #662, Public 
Personnel Association, editor, Keith Ocheltree, p. 1.
7 For a discussion of the dissatisfaction and restlessness 
in the post-war period in the public sector see Rollin
B. Posey, "The New Militancy of Public Employees", Public 
Administration Review, vol. 28 (April, 1968), pp. H i - 117.
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framework that would utilize the militancy and enthusiasm 
of the civil servants hy bringing them within the system, 
the government chose to safeguard its traditional approach. 
Rather than change their methods of dealing with management- 
labour problems the government decided to institutionalize 
legal restrictions aimed at curbing the activities of the 
employee organizations.
The federal government bolstered the Lloyd-La Follette 
Act's implicity clauses banning strike action by civil 
servants with specific clauses in the Taft-Hartley Act of 
1947. The government then found it necessary to bolster
this reinforced stance in 1955 "by making it a felony for
8federal employees to strike. But it soon became apparent 
that the government could not solve the problem of uneasy 
personnel relations in the public sector by legalistic 
means which were not embodied in a bargaining framework.9 
With this realization the government was stimulated to 
seek out better ways to achieve the necessary stability in 
this sector. The avenue the executive branch of govern­
ment chose to pursue towards this end was the one stressing 
joint determination of employer-employee relationships 
through the process of negotiations and collective bargaining.
8 For a discussion of Public Law 330 see Warner, Hennessey, 
op. cit., p. 76.
9 During the Eisenhower administration the cabinet was split 
on the desirability of revising the government's labour- 
management policy in the public sector to embody a bi­
lateral approach. But by 1958 the future course of action 
had settled itself because by then it was apparent that 
some type of bilateral approach was necessary if stability 
was going to be maintained. This can be seen in the
fact that the official opposition to employee organi­
zations which had characterized the administrations of 
both Truman and Eisenhower was forced to undergo radical 
review in 1958. The outcome of this review can be seen 
in Rocco Siciliano's memorandum which is discussed below.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-  6^  -
In 1958, the first major sign of the coming realign­
ment in labour-management relations was seen when Rocco 
Siciliano, the Special Assistant to President Eisenhower 
for Personnel Management, sent a letter to all departments 
and agency heads advising each of them to "evaluate the 
personnel management activities of his own agency with 
respect to employee-management relations, including relations 
with employee organizations.
But by 1960 advisory statements such as the one above 
were not sufficient; the matter of staff relations could 
no longer be put off by placating the staff associations 
with executive policies that attempted to reform conditions 
within the present framework. What was needed by i960, if 
widespread labour discontent and instability were to be 
averted, was a whole new framework of labour-management 
relations that recognized the utility of the bargaining 
process. It is likely that if the Democratic leadership 
which came to the White House in 1961 had continued the 
policy of official opposition towards the representatives 
of the federal employees chaos would have more than likely 
resulted in the public sector. But President Kennedy did 
not follow the traditional role of opposing the establish­
ment of a new and more realistic set of ground rules 
regulating employer-employee relations. He acknowledged 
both the problem that existed in this area and the urgency
10 Quoted in Vosloo, op. cit., p. 99.
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of it by appointing a task force in 1961 which was to report 
back to the executive no later than November 30 of that 
year. The task force was appointed to investigate the 
question of Mhow to improve practices which will assure 
the rights and obligations of employees, employee organ­
izations and the Executive Branch in pursuing the objective
of effective labour-management co-operation in the public 
11service.” But even before the task force reported, 
President Kennedy in a letter to all departments gave 
advance notice of the changes that were to come.
The right of all employees of the 
Federal government to join and participate 
in the activities of employee organizations 
and to seek to improve working conditions 
and the resolution of grievances should 
be recognized by management officials at 
all levels in all departments and agencies.
The participation of Federal employees 
in the formulation and implementation of 
employee policies and procedures affecting 
them contributes to the effective conduct 
of public business.
I believe this participation should 
include consultations by responsible 
officials with representation of employees 
and Federal employee organizations. 12
Finally, on January 17, 1962 President Kennedy issued 
Executive Order 10988 which formalized, for the first time, 
a structured form of collective bargaining in the American 
public sector. The following discussion of Executive Order
11 White House Memorandum from President to Heads of 
Departments and Agencies, Subject* Employee-Management 
Relations in the Federal Service, June 22, 1961, 
quoted in ibid., p. 108.
12 Quoted in M. B. Nesbitt, The Civil Service Merit System 
and Collective Bargaining, New York University, Ph.D. 
1962, University Microfilms Inc., p. 125.
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10988 will, as pointed out earlier, centre around its 
adaptability to the basic framework of collective bar­
gaining which was developed in chapter I.
Executive Order IO988 granted federal employees the 
right to form, join and assist any employee organization, 
and conversely it also granted them the right to refrain 
from participating in these organizations in any fashion 
whatsoever!^ The order then allowed for recognition of 
these employee organizations on one of three levels* 
exclusive recognition, formal recognition, or informal 
recognition. Exclusive recognition is to be given to an 
employee organization that satisfies three basic criteria; 
one, it has a stable membership of at least 10 per cent in
lit
an appropriate unit; two, it has been designated or
13 The right to join and/or to assist an employee organ­
ization is subject to the scrutiny of management, who 
can claim that the official duties of an employee 
constitutes a conflict of interest with membership in 
either an employee organization or its management, 
and as a result can bar his membership. There is no 
appeal for the employee who is so designated except 
to the official who made the original decision. See 
Executive Order 10988, Section (6).
14 The question of what constitutes an appropriate bar­
gaining unit is left to the discretion of each depart­
ment and agency. The employee organization may ask 
the Secretary of Labour to investigate their claims 
for recognition as a bargaining unit but his role as 
an arbitrator is only an advisory one to the depart­
ment or agency. This is in contrast to the private 
sector where the appropriateness of a bargaining unit 
is determined by an independent board, usually the 
State Labour Relations Board. These independent 
boards play an important role in the bargaining pro­
cess as they ensure an existence for each part that is 
independent of the other. When one side is dependent 
on the other for its formal existence, as is the case 
in the American public sector, it cannot help but 
weaken the collective bargaining framework.
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selected by a majority of the employees of the unit as their 
representative;*5 and three, it has submitted to the agency 
or department in which it is located a roster of its officers
and representatives, a copy of its constitution and by-laws
1 £>and a statement of its objectives. Once given exclusive 
recognition by the agency or department the employee organi­
zation is entitled for a period of at least twelve months to 
act for and negotiate agreements covering all the employees 
in the unit.
Formal recognition is granted to organizations that satisfy 
all the criteria required for exclusive recognition except the 
one requiring a majority of supporters within the bargaining 
unit. Informal recognition is given to any employee organization 
which does not qualify for exclusive or formal recognition 
because of its size or the status of other organized groups 
in the unit.
What this tripartite method of recognition means is that 
unless exclusive recognition is granted to an employee organi­
zation within a bargaining unit there cannot be any bilateral
15
A majority of members means at least 50 per cent of the 
votes cast are in favour of exclusive recognition with 
a minimum of 60 per cent of the members within the bar­
gaining unit voting. This is in contrast to the private 
sector where only a majority of those voting is required.
1 f\
This information is required because the order stipulates 
that organizations that (1) recognize the right to strike, 
(2) advocate the overthrow of the government, or (3) discri­
minate with regards to the terms or condition of membership 
because of race, colour, creed or national origin, are not 
to be recognized. Also the "Standards of Conduct for 
Employee Organizations and Code of Fair Labor Practices", 
which was a Presidential Memorandum supplementing the 
Executive Order, "requires employee organizations to main­
tain standards of conduct that ensure democratic procedures 
and practices and requires them to exclude Communists, other 
totalitarians and corrupt persons". Warner, Hennessey, 
op.cit., p. 73*
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negotiations that affect the entire unit. In other words, 
negotiations between management and labour will have to be 
conducted on several different planes with no overall policy 
being evolved that will cover all the employees. But not 
only is there no written agreement covering all the employees, 
there is no written agreement covering any of the employees 
in the unit because since no one organization represents 
all the employees, management is not required to negotiate 
a written agreement. Management is required by law only to 
consult with formal organizations and to hear briefs from 
them, but nothing concrete as far as binding agreements can 
come out of these negotiations. Informal organizations, on 
the other hand, do not even enjoy free access to management 
for consultation but can only put forth their views "to the 
extent (that is) consistent with the efficient and orderly 
conduct of public business".
It would seem then that the bilateral negotiations 
which are a prerequisite for a meaningful bargaining frame­
work are only possible when an employee organizations is 
granted exclusive recognition. But even this is not exactly 
true because when an employee organization is granted exclu­
sive recognition, bargaining on a strict bilateral basis 
can still not take place. The Executive Order requires 
that all negotiated agreements must be approved by the head 
of the department or agency in which the bargaining unit 
is located or by an official designated by him.^®
^  Executive Order IO988, Section 4 (6).
Executive Order IO988, Section ?•
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Management negotiators cannot make final and binding agree­
ments at the bargaining table? they must refer all 
decisions up to top management. In the private sector the 
role of the negotiator is distinct from the organizational 
hierarchy of his firm or department, and this allows him 
to engage in responsible and relevant negotiations because 
his statements have a fair amount of credibility and 
meaning. In the American public sector this is not the 
ease? the result of the role of the negotiator not being 
distinct from the organizational hierarchy of the depart­
ments is that his role as a responsible unit in the bar­
gaining process is negated. The referal of decisions 
places a great deal of stress on the concepts of bilateral 
and of efficacious negotiations both of which play a vital 
role in the bargaining framework developed in chapter I. 
This has proven to be a major shortcoming in the American 
situation, as the unions have been complaining that "agency 
heads are second guessing local officials and are over- 
restrictive in delegating sufficient authority to the 
local levels to permit meaningful negotiations.
The discussion of recognition and the role of manage­
ment showed that in the area of bilateral negotiations the 
Executive Order failed to duplicate the basic mechanisms 
of the bargaining framework. The second place that the 
proposals of Executive Order 10988 run into conflict with 
the basic framework of collective bargaining is in the 
area of pertinent negotiations.
19 Arvid Anderson, "The U. S. Experience in Collective Bar'
gaining in Public Employment", editor Warner, op. cit«.
p. 27•
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Meaningful negotiations basically implies two things; 
first, that negotiations take place on all the major areas 
that affect the relationship between management and labour, 
and second, that the negotiations on these topics are con­
ducted in a responsible fashion.
As shown above2® negotiations in the private sector extend 
to all the important matters affecting the relationship between 
labour and management. These included wages and wage supple­
ment programmes, working time, seniority and job rights, and 
operating rules and industrial jurisprudence.21 In the public 
sector in the United States at the federal level the breadth 
of negotiable items is not nearly as broad as in the private 
sector. The scope of the negotiations depends to a large 
degree on the form of union recognition that is afforded to 
the employee organization, but since the breadth of negotiable 
items broadens from a narrow base at the informal level to an 
all-inclusive one at the exclusive level the discussion can 
be concentrated on this latter tier.
Exclusive recognition means that one employee organization 
serves as the spokesman to management for all employees included 
in the unit; consequently, management must negotiate and reach 
an agreement only with it. But the areas which this exclusive 
organization can negotiate on are fairly limited. The 
Executive Order states explicitly that negotiable matters shall 
not extend "to such areas of discretion and policy as the 
mission of an agency, its budget, its organization and the
Chapter 1, pp. 24-29.
21
Supra,
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assignment of its personnel, or the technology of performing 
its work”.22 This means that the employee organizations are 
not permitted ”to negotiate on wages, retirement, insurance, 
annual and sick leave, and holidays because these decisions 
are made by Congress”.23 The employees, then, have no say 
on the matters which are considered to be the core of vital 
ones in the private sector; they are restricted to negotiation 
on secondary matters such as grievances, personnel policy and 
practices, and matters affecting working conditions such as 
overtime distribution, car allowance, call in and wash-up
o Jl
time, apprentice shop councils and the like.
But not only are the employee organizations required
to bargain in a limited field of activity, they are also
forced to operate under the further restriction that
...in the administration of all matters 
covered by the agreement officials and 
employees are governed by the provisions 
of any existing or future laws and regu­
lations, including policies set forth 
in the Federal Personnel Manual and 
agency regulations which may be applic­
able, and the agreement shall at all 
times be applied subject to such laws, 
regulations and policies. ^
In transplanting the framework of collective bargaining 
from the private sector to the public sector the area of 
negotiable items underwent a severe transformation, as it 
was both narrowed and put on a very unsteady foundation. The
22 Executive Order 10988, Section 6 (6).
J Warner, Hennessey, op.cit., p. 80.
^  Ibid., p. 80.
2 5 Executive Order 10988, Section 7 (!)•
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result is a great deal of discontent, as the employee organi­
zations feel that in order to have responsible negotiations, 
and hence a stable relationship, the scope of negotiable items 
must be expanded.
The second meaning implicit in the phrase meaningful 
negotiations is that negotiations are conducted in a respon­
sible fashion. Similar to the private sector attempts to r I 
safeguard the responsibility criteria of negotiations are ' y 
made through legislative means. In the private sector 
standards of negotiations are safeguarded through various 
legislative acts? these include the Wagner Act of 1935* 
the Taft-Hartley Act of 19^7* and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 
1959* If one °f fhe two parties engaged in the bargaining 
process breaks one of the regulations embodies in one of 
these acts the other has recourse to the courts. In the 
public sector an attempt was made in 19^3 to inculcate a 
similar framework of responsibility with the passage of 
the Standards of Conduct for Employee Organizations and,
Code of Fair Labour Practices in the Federal Service, by 
executive order. The Standards are designed to impose 
upon union and management in the federal sphere the same 
responsibilities required of similar structures in the 
private sector. Labour is required to work within a given fO 
framework which includes the maintenance of democratic 
procedures and practices, the exclusion from union office ^ 
of communists or corrupt persons, the prohibition of con­
flict of interest on the part of union officials, and the 
maintenance of fiscal integrity. Management on the other
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hand is prohibited from interfering with employee rights 
under the Order, including the encouragement or discourage­
ment of union membership by discrimination; the provision 
of assistance to union; the discrimination against 
employees for having filed a grievance; refusal to grant 
to the employee organizations the recognition which they 
qualify for; and refusal to negotiate, consult or bargain 
with a union as required by Executive Order IO988.
On paper it appears is if the legislative guidelines 
which safeguard responsible negotiations in the private 
sector have been transplanted to the public sector. But 
this is not really the case. In the public sector there 
is no effective means the employee organizations can use 
to force an agency or department to comply to these 
standards.
An employee organization which feels an 
agency has violated the Code of Fair 
Labour Practices may file a charge against 
the agency. The agency does not have to 
conduct a hearing on the charge unless 
it finds there is a "substantial basis 
for complaint". If the agency decides 
to hold a hearing, it must name an im­
partial hearing officer, who may be one 
of the agency's own employees. Manage­
ment acts as defendant, judge and jury 
all at the same time.
If management is found to have vio­
lated the Code, Section 3^ of the Code 
directs the agency to immediately take 
necessary action in accordance with the 
decision to remedy the violation. If 
the agency refuses to take corrective 
action, the Code allows no recourse 
for the employee organization.^5
26 Warner, Hennessey, op.cit., p. 83*
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On the other hand if the employee organization violates 
the Code, management can suspend or revoke the recognition 
of the organization.
This is not an equitable arrangement, nor is it one 
which is conducive to responsible negotiations. Therefore, 
the introduction of a collective bargaining framework into 
the American public sector can be seen to be lacking an­
other basic mechanism which is essential to its operation.
The third major area where the model of collective 
bargaining is thwarted in the American public sector is in 
the area of conciliating differences between management and 
labour. In the private sector impasses between the two 
are solved through a variety of means which may include 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, industrial welfare, 
or any combination of these. In the American public sec­
tor however, there are no procedural rules or processes
pO
such as these to resolve impasses in bargaining. If 
there is an issue that cannot be agreed upon by management 
and labour then there is no agreement. Management in the 
bargaining process has the final sayj if it approves the 
agreement it is signed, if it does not then it has to go 
back to bargaining until an agreement is submitted which 
is conducive to the wishes of management.
2? For a thorough discussion of the Code see Yosloo, 
op. cit., pp. 149-152.
28 Although there is no structured method to solve impasses 
in the public sector generally, a number of departments 
and agencies have voluntarily agreed to submit to a 
process of mediation. Anderson claims that approximately 
10 per cent of the current collective agreements in the 
federal service provide for mediation. Anderson, op.cit., 
p. 27. However, it must be remembered that management 
still has the final say as it can disregard any previous 
commitment made if it is in conflict with its 'mission*.
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No agreements are valid unless approved 
by top management and they are to be made 
with the understanding that in emergency 
situations a government activity must be 
free to take whatever actions are neces­
sary to carry out its mission, regardless 
of prior commitments. To the same effect, 
all arbitration decisions are advisory.
There is no provision for the arbitration 
of negotiation impasses.29
The prerogative of not signing an agreement is not 
unique to the public sector; in the private sector an 
agreement does not become enforceable until both the 
representatives of management and the bargaining unit have 
signed it. But if management refuses to sign the agreement 
in the private sector the union has recourse to a number 
of weapons which can be used to apply pressure and make it 
either too costly for management not to sign, or necessary 
through a process of binding arbitration. In the public 
sector in the United States at the federal level no such 
pressure can be exerted on management, and as a consequence 
it is not under any real pressure to make concessions.
The fourth place where the application of the frame­
work of collective bargaining to the public sector breaks 
down is in the area of contract adjudication. In the pri­
vate sector a fairly standardized grievance procedure has 
evolved which allows for binding arbitration by an impartial 
arbitrator on all questions that arise through the inter­
pretation or application of the collective agreement.The
29 Vosloo, op. cit., p. 132.
30 Supra, pp.(
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Executive Order attempted to 'borrow this procedure from 
the private sector, hut like much of the transplanting of 
the basic framework of collective bargaining it was a 
twisted and an abortive attempt. Like most of the other 
clauses in the order the proposal dealing with the grievance 
procedure is weighted too much on the management side.
The procedure, similar to the private sector, provides for 
an arbitration of differences than extend from the inter­
pretation or application of agreements, but it then states 
that "such arbitration shall be advisory in nature with 
any decision or recommendation subject to the approval of 
the agency head."-^
The objective of Executive Order 10988 was stability 
in the public sector? the means it provided in order that 
this could be achieved was the introduction of collective 
bargaining into the public sector. But in introducing 
collective bargaining to this sector the Order did not 
take into account the basic framework of this process as 
it had developed in the private sector. The Executive 
Branch of government attempted to adapt this framework to 
meet their own special needs? in doing so they only adop­
ted a partial framework of bargaining and then attempted 
to mix this with the old method of public employee relations 
which was based on paternalism and unilateral decision­
making. The end result was that it failed to achieve its1 
objectives.
31 Executive Order IO988, Section 8 (6).
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The failure of Executive Order 10988 becomes very 
evident when one reads the profusion of current literature 
which is emanating from this sector.^ <phe current dis­
satisfaction and unrest can also be seen in the activities 
of the huge postal Onions. Both the Postal Clerks* Union 
and Letter Carriers* Union recently (1969) dropped the no 
strike clause from their constitution in direct violation 
of the Executive Order and are presently on a collision 
course with the administration.
Therefore, collective bargaining as it was introduced 
into the American public sector appears to have been a 
failure; but before any arguments are put forth as to 
why it was a failure and what can be done to make the pro­
cess a more viable one, I will review the Canadian 
experiences in this field.
32 Articles which bring out the point that the present 
structure of collective bargaining in the American 
public service is inadequate include; Marvin J.
Levine, "Dealing with Inadequacies in Collective 
Bargaining in the Federal Government", Public 
Personnel Review, vol. 30 (July, 1969)* pp. 164-168. 
"New Directions in Bargaining", American Federationist, 
vol. 70, pp. 18-21. J. H. Foegen, "The Partial Strike; 
A Solution in Public Employment;, Public Personnel 
Review, vol. 30 (April,1969), pp. 83-87. Robert E. 
Catlin, "Should Public Employees Have the Right to 
Strike", Public Personnel Review, vol. 29 (January, 
1968), pp. 2-6. Posey, op. cit., pp. 111-117.
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Chapter IV
Collective Bargaining in the Canadian Public Sector
The application of the framework of collective bar­
gaining to the structured form of bargaining that exists 
in the American public sector showed that the two did not 
correspond. It was apparent throughout chapter III that 
the executive in the United States was not really intent 
on replacing the old method of unilateral decision making 
for one based on relevant bilateral negotiations. The 
concept of sovereign supremacy is apparent throughout the 
new approach; the government did not relinquish any of 
its ultimate authority. The result, as was seen, was an 
abortive type of collective bargaining which merely 
attempted to placate the public servants. The model of 
collective bargaining was not adhered to; consequently 
the Executive Order did not, and could not, fulfil its 
primary aid, which was to generate a more stable civil 
service.
Canadian legislation in this area also had the 
ultimate aim of establishing stability in the public 
sector. The means it chose to pursue this end was also a 
form of collective bargaining. This chapter will concern 
itself with a comparison of the structured form of col­
lective bargaining which was introduced into the Canadian
1 The objective of the government in introducing this 
legislation was "to preserve the capacity of the public 
service to function effectively in serving the people 
of Canada". Lester Pearson, Debates, April 25, 19o6, 
p. 4244.
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public sector with the outline developed in chapter I.
This will be done in order to see if there is a relation­
ship between the degree of conformity and the degree of 
stability#
The Canadian legislation on the subject of staff
2
relations in the public sector, unlike the American, 
attempted to embody into its framework of collective bar­
gaining the principle of bilateral negotiations. Bill 
C-182 which became An Act to Amend the Financial Adminis­
tration Act was designed primarily for this purpose. This 
act provided for the expansion of the functions of Treasury 
Board which enabled it to assume the role of employer in 
negotiations with representatives of the employees. This 
was achieved by revising sections 5 and 7 of the Financial 
Administration Act.
The revision of Section 5 allowed Treasury Board to 
assume the responsibilities associated with personnel manage­
ment in the public service. Section 7 provided for a num­
ber of new functions to be placed under the jurisdiction 
of Treasury Board which would enhance its role as director 
of personnel management. These functions included the 
responsibility for the determination of manpower require­
ments, for establishing guidelines for training and
2 Canadian legislation on the subject of Collective Bar­
gaining in the public sector consisted of three Acts, 
"The Public Service Staff Relations Act", An Act 
Representing Employee Relations in the Public Service 
of Canada, S.C., (1967). c. 72; "The Public Service 
Employment Act", An Act Respecting Employment in the 
Public Service of Canada, S.C., (1967). c. 71: and An
Act to Amend the Financial Administration Act, S.C., 
TT967), c. 7^ .
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development of personnel, for the classification system, 
for the disciplinary standards, for work standards, for 
pay rates, and for hours of work. It was necessary to con­
solidate these functions under one central agency because 
collective bargaining is basically a two-party relationship. 
Consequently, it was considered imperative to have authority 
and responsibility in all essential matters invested in one 
agency in order that it could negotiate with the employee 
organizations in a responsible fashion.
The concentration of responsibility in the Treasury
Board, in my assessment, has worked out very well. It has
assumed much the same role as the negotiating team for
management has in the private sector. The acceptance and
effectiveness of this "steely eyed team of negotiators"^
can be seen in a statement by J. F. Maguire, the Research
Director of the Public Service Alliance of Canada*
The road travelled so far under collective 
bargaining has not been an easy one. Bar­
gaining with the Treasury Board has nearly 
always been hard. At times, it has been a 
lengthy, stubborn process. This has been 
particularly true in areas where the Treasury 
Board has been reluctant to yield, through 
the collective bargaining process, rights 
which management has traditionally in the 
past kept as its own, i.e. the right to 
make the final decision with respect to 
implementing and changing conditions of 
employment. ^
3 Clive Baxter, "No Holds are Barred in this Diplomacy", 
The Financial Post, December 27, 19^9, p* 3*
4 J. F. Maguire, Development and Experience of Collective 
Bargaining to Date, an unpublished paper delivered to 
the Technical Inspection Group, May, 1969, p. 8.
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By placing authority for management decisions in the 
hands of Treasury Board the Canadian Government was recog­
nizing the need for bilateral negotiations. But as was 
brought out in the example of the United States it is es­
sential that the employee organizations have an independent 
existence before it cam be said that a significant two 
party relationship exists. The Canadian legislation 
attempted to ensure this condition by establishing an 
independent board, the Public Service Staff Relations 
Board (P.S.S.R.B.). This board was set up, along the 
lines of the Labour Relations Boards that exist in the 
private sector, to administer the Public Service Staff 
Relations Act (P.S.S.R.A.).
The P.S.S.R.B. is an independent board which is com­
posed of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and not less than 
four, nor more than eight other members appointed in equal 
numbers to represent the employer and the employees respec­
tively. 5 The Chairman and the Vice Chairman are appointed 
by the Governor in Council and they hold office during good 
behaviour for a period not exceeding ten years. Each of 
the other members of the Board are also appointed by the 
Governor in Council and they are appointed for terms of up
5 The Board as it is presently constituted consists of a 
Chairman, a Vice Ghairman, and eight other members; 
four representing the employer and four representing 
the employees. It also has a full time secretariat 
to carry out the administrative work.
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to seven years. The responsibilities of this Board include 
determining the appropriateness of a bargaining unit^, 
certifying bargaining units, and investigating complaints 
made by either the employer or the representative of the 
employees regarding any activities on the part of the other 
that are contrary to any of the provisions set forth in 
the Act. The Board also has the authority to order redress 
in so far as its investigation demonstrated that such action 
is warranted.
When the P.S.S.R.B. receives an application from an 
employee organization requesting certification as a bar­
gaining agent, it must determine three things; first, 
whether the bargaining agent represents a properly defined 
bargaining unit; second, whether the majority of the 
employees in the unit want the employee organization to 
represent them as their bargaining agent;' and third, 
whether the employee organization is competent to organize 
and conduct meaningful negotiations. The Board may chal­
lenge an employee organization on any of the above factors
6 In determining the appropriateness of a unit the Board 
considers "the duties and classification of the employees 
in the proposed bargaining unit in relation to any other 
plan of classification as it may apply to the employees 
in the proposed bargaining unit". Also the Board ensures 
that the proposed bargaining unit includes only employees 
of one occupational category, fcee appendix A), since 
workers of more than one category are not allowed to be 
grouped into the same unit. See the Public Service Staff 
Relations Act, Section 32.
7 A majority of employees, unlike the American case, means 
a plurality of those voting.
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by investigating the appropriateness of the bargaining 
unit, by ordering a representative vote to ensure that the 
majority of the employees do, in fact, want the employee 
organization to represent them, or by examining evidence, 
records and other documents respecting the organizations 
constitution, election practices, and character of its 
officials to ensure their competence.
Unlike the American situation in collective bargaining, 
the Canadian employee organizations can be seen to have an 
existence that is independent of the whims of management. 
This autonomy enhances the two party relationship which is 
so essential to the bargaining process. Thus collective 
bargaining as it is structured in the Canadian public ser­
vice duplicates to a large degree the bilateral relationship 
that exists in the private sector. The one significant 
difference is the requirement that the employee organization 
be considered competent to carry out the processes involved 
in collective bargaining before it is granted recognition. 
However, this requirement, which has never been invoked, 
does not directly affect the basic framework of bargaining
and as such can be considered as an outgrowth of it which
8is peculiar to the public environment.
The next important part of the model of collective 
bargaining is the concept of meaningful negotiations. It 
was pointed out in chapter III that there are two important
8 This requirement can be seen to have some justification 
in the public sector because of its political nature.
The government is ultimately responsible for all policies 
and as such needs to ensure that it is dealing with a 
responsible party.
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aspects to this concept. First, the ability of each side
to bargain in a responsible and a binding fashion, and
second, the scope of negotiations. The first aspect has
already been dealt with earlier in this chapter.9 it was
pointed out that Treasury Board has assumed the role of
management negotiator which means that it can make binding
decisions. Also, as it was pointed out earlier, the
P.S.S.R.B. can investigate a complaint by either side that
bargaining is not being conducted in accordance with the
procedures outlined in the Public Service Staff Relations
Act. The, in light of its investigation, it can order a
party that is not bargaining faithfully to correct its
ways. If the party refuses to do so, the Board can lay a
1 0report before Parliament.
The second important aspect of meaningful negotiations, 
the scope of bargaining, is the first place that the struc­
tured form of collective bargaining in Canada does not cor­
respond directly with the framework developed in chapter I. 
This is because there are three important areas that remain 
outside the bargaining process. The first area is defined 
in the Public Service Employment Act? the second in section 
7 of the P.S.S.R.A.j and the third in section $6 of the 
same act.
The Public Service Employment Act removed all those
matters from the bargaining process "which are clearly
11
related to the preservation of the merit system”, and
9 supra, pp. (j
10 See the Public Service Staff Relations Act, section 21.
11 Warner, Hennessey, op. cit.. p. 336.
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vested them in the Public Service Commission. These in­
cluded initial appointments, promotions, transfers, demotions, 
lay-offs, and the determination of the qualifications which 
are required for employment and advancement.
It was felt that in order to maintain the merit system, 
a system which has been accepted in modern western societies 
as the most desirable type on which to structure a bureau­
cracy, it would be necessary to have an impartial commission 
continue to regulate employment standards. However, the 
Government realized that it would not be feasible to have 
the Commission setting up employment standards in an 
arbitrary fashion when the rest of the activities con­
cerning staff relations were governed by a bargaining pro­
cess. Consequently some provision had to be made to allow 
for consultations between the Public Service Commission and 
the representatives of both the employer and the employee.
This was done by incorporating in the Act a clause which 
stated that
The Commission shall from time to time 
consult with representatives of any 
employee organization certified as a 
bargaining agent under the Public Ser­
vice Staff Relations Act or with any 
employer as defined in that Act, with 
respect to the selection standards that 
may be prescribed under subsection (1) 
or the principles governing the appraisal, 
promotion, demotion, transfer, lay-off 
or release of employees, at the request 
of such representatives or of the 
employer or where in the opinion of 
the Commission such consultation is 
necessary or desirable.12
12 Public Service Employment Act, Part II, section 12 (3).
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However consultation is not the same as negotiation* con­
sultation only implies dialogue* it does not necessarily 
mean that an agreement will he reached.
Section ? of the Public Service Staff Relations Act
defines the second area of employer-employee relations that
is outside the bargaining process. It establishes the
managerial rights of the employer and states that "nothing
in this Act shall be construed to effect the right or
authority of the employer, to determine the organization
of the Public Service and to assign duties and to classify
13positions therein". J This establishes very clearly
that the areas of job organization, 
technological change, assignment of 
work and classification of positions, 
is a right of the employer and, if 
the employer desires, is not bargain- 
able. The experience with bargaining 
so far confirms that the employer is 
definitely not prepared to negotiate 
any of these matters.^
Section 56 of the Act outlines a further limitation on
the scope of collective bargaining in the public sector.
No collective agreement shall provide, 
directly or indirectly, for the alter­
ation or elimination of any existing 
term or condition of employment or the 
establishment of any term or condition 
of employment, the alteration or eli­
mination of which or the establishment 
of which, as the case may be, would re­
quire or have the effect of requiring 
the enactment or amendment of any legis­
lation by Parliament except for the pur­
poses of appropriating money required 
for its implementation.15
13 Public Service Staff Relations Act, section (7).
lh Robert Giroux, Notes for Talk to the Ottawa-Hull Area 
Council Seminar, October 30* 1969, an unpublished paper.
15 Public Service Staff Relations Act, section 56.
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This in effect means that the Government is hanging onto 
the concept of sovereignty. In one area, the monetary 
realm, it agreed to limit its sovereignty; in all other 
areas it maintains the final say by forcing bargaining to 
operate within the context of existing legislation. This 
is not to say that there is not a great deal of flexibility
involved in negotiations in the public sector; it is only
an assertion of the fact that negotiations are required to 
operate within broad parameters, and if one of the parties 
wants to go beyond these boundaries they cannot do so 
through the bargaining process but must concentrate on 
initiating legislative changes.
The deviation from the basic framework of bargaining
in the area of the scope of the bargaining process, is not,
however, as serious as in the American situation. The 
employee organizations in Canada are able to negotiate 
rates of pay, hours of work, leave entitlement, standards 
of discipline, and general conditions of employment. These 
are the important areas as far as the employees are con­
cerned and consequently the amount of instability generated 
by the limitations on negotiations which were discussed 
above is not great. However, the areas that are presently 
outside the scope of collective bargaining have not been 
accepted as final by the employee organizations. They are 
constantly trying to get management to voluntarily give up 
the prerogatives outlined in section 7 at the bargaining 
table and are directing their efforts towards the legis­
lative process to get section 56 modified.
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The next important area of the outline of collective 
"bargaining that has to "be applied to the Canadian situation 
is the structured framework in which impasses "between 
management and labour are resolved. The Americans did not 
transplant this aspect of the model into their public sec­
tor, and its absence has contributed to the generation of 
an unstable environment due to the preponderance of power 
that has been left in the hands of management. The 
Canadian Government did not want the same situation to 
exist in their public sector and consequently leaned to­
wards the example q£iablished in the private sector.
In the Canadian public sector there are two methods of
dispute settlement incorporated in the structure of collective
bargaining, and before an employee organization is allowed to
bargain collectively it must specify which one it prefers.
Two dispute settlement options are provided 
in the bill...one providing for a procedure 
requiring a reference to a conciliation board 
and permitting strike action, except in the 
case of employees whose services are consi­
dered essential to the safety or security of 
the public.
16 Excerpt from Current Report on Legislation Affecting 
Labour, Number 3> June 27, 1966. Prepared by Legislation 
Branch, Department of Labour, Ottawa, Canada. The 
employer under the Public Service Staff Relations Act 
has the right to designate employees in any Occupational 
Group whom it feels should be prohibited from striking 
due to their importance to the safety and the security 
of the State. This is a unilateral decision on the part 
of the employer. However, on the request of the bargaining 
agent, the employer must furnish the P.S.S.R.B. with a 
list of those employees or classes of employees which it 
considers to be essential. If the bargaining agent dis­
agrees with the list, it can appeal to the P.S.S.R.B. which 
has the power to make the ultimate decision in the matter.
As of January, 1968, only 86 out of 30,000 employees who 
had opted for conciliation had been designated. See Jacob 
Pinkleman, "The Public Service Staff Relations Act", Public 
Personnel Reviewi Public Service Alliance of Canada, vol. 4l, 
(December, 1968), p. 30.
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If the bargaining unit decides to submit to arbitration it 
loses its recourse to the strike.1? It must be content to 
request the services of the Public Service Arbitration 
Tribunal to arbitrate disputes arising out of the nego­
tiation process. This Tribunal consists of a chairman 
appointed by the Governor in Council on the recommendation 
of the P.S.S.R.B., and
two panels of other members, one panel 
to consist of at least three persons 
appointed by the Board as being rep­
resentative of the interests of the 
employer and the other to consist of 
at least three persons appointed by 
the Board as being representative of 
the interests of employees.18
Awards by the Arbitration Tribunal are binding on both 
the Government and the employees in the bargaining unit 
concerned.*9 The scope of the Tribunal in making its awards 
is only as broad as the subject matter of negotiable items; 
the Arbitration Tribunal cannot make awards on questions 
that are "not a subject of negotiation between the parties 
during the period before arbitration was r e q u e s t e d ' ?  .20 This 
means that the award cannot contain provisions requiring 
legislative implementation "nor can it deal with the stan­
dards, procedures or processes governing the appointment, 
appraisal, promotion, demotion, transfer, lay-off or
17' The method of settlement, however, can be changed prior 
to another round of bargaining.
3.8
Public Service Staff Relations Act, section 60.
1^ Lester Pearson, then the Prime Minister of Canada, stressed 
the binding nature of arbitration on both parties when 
he introduced Bill C-170» "Arbitration will be equally 
binding on the employer, the government, and the employee, 
the public servant." Debates, April 25, 1966, p. ^246.
20 Ihid., section 70 (3).
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release of employees".2 -^
If the "bargaining unit does not choose to use the "binding 
arbitration approach to resolve their differences they have to 
opt for the conciliation and strike approach. This approach 
is very similar to the one which is present in the private 
sector. A strike in the public sector is only legal seven 
days after the receipt, by the chairman of the P.S.S.R.B., 
of a conciliation report, or after he has notified the parties 
that he is not going to appoint a conciliation board.
In the private sector all industries retain the right 
to strike if their negotiations with management fail; strike 
action is the ultimate weapon and is guarded jealously.
The approach in the Canadian public sector differs from 
this, as was shown above, but this does not mean that the 
Canadian approach contradicts the basic framework of col­
lective bargaining. The framev/ork simply indicates that a 
structured form of conflict resolution must exist which is 
capable of solving impasses between management and labour.
It has already been said that a structure exists in which 
conflicts can be resolved; what needs to be done to verify 
conformity with the basic framework is to demonstrate that 
the structure is capable of fulfilling its task.
In Canada, as of December 1969, "there were 10^ bar­
gaining units comprising 183,500 employees. Thus far in 
the first round of negotiations over half of the bargaining 
units have already signed their first agreement and their 
signed contracts cover over 80 per cent of the eligible
^  Ibid., section 70 (3)»
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public servants. This is quite an accomplishment when
it is taken into account that there are "first agreements
and the bargaining process usually takes much longer than
with renewed agreements, where the number of issues that
23are raised at the bargaining table is much smaller." J 
The number of contracts signed in the last two and a half 
years (1967-69), under the added burden of being first 
agreements, demonstrates that the structured method of 
conflict resolution is capable of performing the task it 
was created to do.
Thus far it has been shown that except in the area of 
the scope of bargaining, the Canadian structure of collec­
tive bargaining has conformed with the model developed in 
chapter I. This conformity also extends to that area of 
the framework which suggested that a written agreement which 
is designed to regulate the activities of both parties over 
a given period of time must be the outcome of negotiations.
22 As of December 1969* there were approximately 185,000 
employees who could conceivably be included in a 
collective agreement.,Out of this number approximately 
136,000 employees represented by the Public Service 
Alliance of Canada (P.S.A.C.) were covered by contracts 
and about another 25,000 employees, represented by the 
Council of Postal Workers and other small unions were 
also covered. These figures were arrived at from data 
given by Jacob Finkleman, "Public Service Staff Relations 
Board", Argus Journal, vol. 4 (December, 1969), p« 3** 
and "Where We Stand on Certification", Argus Journal, 
vol. 4 (November, 1969).
23 Finkleman, Argus Journal, op. cit., p. 3»
24 It can be argued that the first round of bargaining was 
the honeymoon period of public service staff relations 
which would mean that the process could become bogged 
down in subsequent rounds*. I would suggest, however, 
that such is not the case as the precedent has been 
established for conflict resolution. The validity of 
either hypothesis, however, can only be ascertained by 
further developments.
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Management and labour in the Canadian public sector conform 
to this requirement as they are bound by the terms of 
collective agreement which they have negotiated. If they 
are unable to reach an agreement and the matter has to be 
referred to binding arbitration, then both sides are bound 
by the arbitral award.
The last important segment of the basic framework of 
collective bargaining that remains to be applied to the 
Canadian situation is the one which is concerned with the 
resolution of conflicts that arise out of the interpretation 
and application of the collective agreement. As was seen 
in chapter III the American Government established a struc­
ture to perform this function. This structure was not, 
however, a viable one because it favoured one of the parties. 
The other party, as a result, gradually lost confidence in 
the structure. To get away from this type of situation 
the Canadian Government decided to adopt with minor modifi­
cations the structure which had evolved in the private 
sector to perform this function.
The function of contract interpretation, therefore,is 
performed in the Canadian structure by the grievance pro­
cedure. Grievances concerning the application and inter­
pretation of the contract have to go through three primary
25 The collective agreement or arbitral award must be 
honoured by both parties. This is modified, however, 
in one instance; the collective agreement is subject 
to the appropriations by or under the authority of 
Parliament of any monies that may be required by the 
employer. See P.S.S.R.A., section 56 (1).
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stages. These stages exist within the organizational 
hierarchy of management and labour. If a settlement can­
not be reached at these levels then the matter leaves the 
organizational hierarchy and goes to binding arbitration 
by a neutral third party. Arbitration is performed by an 
adjudicator whose function it is to interpret the collective 
agreement or arbital award. His decision is final and 
binding on both parties.
Where a decision on any grievance 
referred to adjudication requires any 
action by or on the part of the emp­
loyer, the employer shall take such 
action.
Where a decision on any grievance 
requires any action by or on the part 
of an employee or bargaining agent or 
both of them, the employee or bargaining 
agent or both, as the case may be, 
shall take action..27
The discussion of collective bargaining in the Canadian 
public service at the federal level has demonstrated that, 
except for the area of negotiable items, it has incorporated 
the basic outline of collective bargaining. This should 
mean, if the hypothesis concerning the relationship between 
stability and the degree of implementation of the model is 
correct, that there should be a fair degree of stability 
in the Canadian public sector.
26 Adjudicators are appointed by the Governor in Council, 
on the recommendation of the P.S.S.R.B.
27 P.S.S.R.A., section 96 (^ ) (5)»
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The degree of stability that exists in the Canadian 
public sector can best be seen by looking at the degree of 
friction that exists between the employee organizations 
and Treasury Board. The easiest way to measure this is to 
look at the number of times that these two parties have 
been unable to resolve their own differences in contract 
negotiations. The bargaining process has only broken down
three times. The strike has been used once and binding
28
arbitration twice. This is an extremely good record 
when one considers that over 60 contracts have been 
negotiated, by December, 1969.
The framework of collective bargaining has only been 
operable for two and a half years and as such it is hard 
to predict whether the stability that has been generated 
thus far will continue. The employee organizations are 
confident, however, that if the collective bargaining pro­
cess remains as it is, it will become an even more viable 
instrument of stability in the future.
It is obvious, however, that given 
time to learn to adjust to and live 
with this new system of employer- 
employee relations, collective 
bargaining will provide a benefit 
to us all in the years ahead.29
28 The strike has been used by the Council of Postal 
Workers and binding arbitration by the Communications 
and Education Groups.
29 Maguire, "Development and Experience of Collective 
Bargaining to Date", op. »cit.~, p. 10.
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The danger of instability arising in the future does 
not lie in the structure of collective bargaining, but 
rather in the failure on the part of the government to 
continue to recognize that its responsibilities as an 
employer are separate from its role as government.-^0 
This, of course, would mean an abnegation of the basic 
framework of bargaining, as the two party relationship 
would be placed in jeopardy.
30 This warning was given by Claude Edwards, the president 
of the P.S.A.'C. in an editorial in the Argus Journal, 
vol. b (December, 1969)# p. 2.
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CONCLUSION
The discussion of the Canadian and American legislation 
on collective bargaining in the public sector in regards to their 
adaptability to the framework of collective bargaining demon­
strated that the former represented the model fairly closely 
while the latter had very little resemblance to it at all. My 
hypothesis, at the beginning of this paper, was that stability 
could only be achieved in the public sector through a well 
structured process of bilateral negotiations modelled after the 
framework of collective bargaining as it has developed in the 
private sector. This hypothesis I feel was borne out; Canadian 
legislation conformed to the model of collective bargaining 
and the conformity has resulted, in my opinion, in a fair 
amount of stability. American legislation, on the other hand, 
did not provide for a structured form of collective bargaining 
which incorporated the basic variables embodied in a meaningful 
bargaining framework and this shortcoming has enhanced the 
instability in this sector. The present (March, 1970) unrest 
in the American public sector generated by the postal strike 
reflects the widespread feelings of insecurity and instability 
which are present.
Of course many examples can be given that appear, 
on the surface to contradict my hypothesis, or a profusion of 
arguments can be put forward demonstrating that separate methods 
must be employed in the separate sectors to deal with staff 
relations due to the distinct character of each. However, I 
do not feel that these examples or arguments will stand up in 
the long run.
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For the examples that, are pi.ven to con trad i ct my 
hypothesis T would argue that in these cases the evolutionary 
stage of development of the public service has not yet reached 
the stage where a structured form of bargaining would he
v
beneficial to both parties* For the arguments stating that 
the private and the public sectors ere different and, therefore, 
must be dealt with differentlyj I would counter with examples 
from the private sector showing that collective bargaining; has 
been effectively used i.n industries and services which closely 
represent if not actually perform the same functions as those 
that exist in the public sector. Further, I would suggest that 
in a society based on specialization and differentiation all 
industries and services ultimately work towards the benefit of 
the populace and thus must be considered to be public in nature. 
Thus a differentiation of labour practices based on whether an 
industry or service is public or not has no relevance*
Stability and conformity to the model of collective 
bargaining are intricately woven. When any civil service has 
matured to the extent that it is ready and able to accent the 
responsibility of participating in decisions concerning their 
pay and working conditions, they must be given this responsi­
bility* If they are not, instability and agitation will result. 
This is what has ha.ppened i.n the American civil service, and the 
prospects for a stable public environment in that country arc 
only as bright as the chances of the introduction of meaningful 
bilateral negotiations. Threats, force, bribery or persuasion 
are not suitable alternatives to an active role in activities 
which are considered essential to ones being.
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APPENDIX A
The terms of' reference for the Preparatory Onmmi tt.oa 
on Coll ective Bargaining included the task of developing an 
orderly system of classification that would be conducive to 
the introduction of collective bargaining into the public 
serviced A new classification was necessitated due to the 
fact that the system that existed prior to ]967 was much too 
cumbersome and awkward to be effective in any type of coll.ective 
bargaining situation. The system that was in effect prior to 
the Public Service Staff Relations Act of 1967 contained a 
total of 700 classes which were subdivided into .1700 grades 
and then divided still further into 138,000 classified positions.
In order to pursue its task of upda.ting the classi - 
fioation system, the Preparatory Committee had the Civil Service 
Commission create the Bureau of Classi fioation Revision in 
1964. This Bureau was responsible to the Civil. Service 
Commission until 19 6 7 when the authority for reclassifycation 
was transferred to the Treasury Board, rather.' than the Civil 
Service Commission.
The Bureau was subdivided right from the beginning 
into three main branches to facilitate its t a s k ;  they were 
the Planning Branch, the Operations Branch., and the Structures 
and Standards Branch.-- The Planning Branch was responsible 
for the general planning of approaches to classification for
1 The information on. reclassification was obtained primarily 
from a speech given by J.F. Maguire, Research Director of 
the Public Service Alliance of Canada to a Technical.
Inspection Group in May 1969, and from, an unpublished paper 
prepared by R. Giroux, Assistant Research Director of the 
Civil Service Federation of Canada, in 1 off„
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ench oocunaiional Caierorv before anv wor-T< was done in writ,! nr
x  >—  %J ' %J (..J
the standards. It was also responsible for determining the 
allocation of classes to categories and. occupational croups, 
and for making recommendations as to the appropriate system of
O
classification that should he used to revise the classes.
The Operations Branch of the Bureau of Classification Revision 
was responsible for gathering information on jobs in order to 
facilitate the classification process} they performed this 
function through position questionnaires that concentrated 
on a content analysis of jobs that existed in the Public 
Service. These questionnaires were designed to probe into the 
duties, the responsibilities, the qualification requirements, 
and other pertinent data associated with the various positions 
in order to facilitate the task of the Structures and Standards 
Branch's task which was to develop classification standards.
The Operations Branch was also responsible for training and 
developing classification officers i.n order that competent 
men would be available to interpret and to apply the 
classification standards at the departmental level. The 
Structure and Standards Branch, besides d e v e l o p i n g  classi­
fication standards, was also responsible for formulating rav*  X X  is
plans for each occupational group, and for converting positions
2
The method that was finally adopted was one based on a point 
ratinsr svstem. This svstem was explained verv adequately-u «,• X O  X
by J.F. Maguire and his explanation is reproduced in 
Appendix B.
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from the old classi.f ication system to the n e w .  3
The result of this monumental but necessary under­
taking by the Bureau of Classi float Ion R e v i s i o n ,  was, an 
entirely new system of classification that adopted an occu­
pational approach. The Public Service was divided into six 
occupational categories, each of which contained a. number 
of occupational groups. These six categories along with 
their job description, minimum qualifications, and occupational 
groups, are listed below,
CATEGORIES AND GROUPS 
EXECUTIVE CATEGORY
Description: This category is composed of positions in which
senior responsibilities for government functions are assigned, 
and positions in which there is a requirement for exceptionally 
high standards of performance in the development and execution 
of policy or in administrative improvement and innovation.
Minimum Qualifications:
Demonstrated and outstanding executive abilities.
Occupational Groups:
Senior Executive Group 
General Executive Group
SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL CATEGORY
Description: This category is composed of groups of a scien­
tific or professional character in which there is a requirement, 
for a highly developed nr specialized body of knowledge normally 
acquired through, university education or through the completion 
of extensive post-secondary school training.
3
Two basic problems were encountered in this transformation; one 
was when reclassification resulted in the same job taking on 
a. higher pay scale, and the second was when the same job was 
devaluated to a lower pay scale. In the f.irst case, an 
employee that was affected by an upward evaluation would be 
"green-circled"; this means that his pay would be elevated to 
a corresponding pay rate within the higher category; In the 
latter ce.se, the employee would be "red-circled" ,whi oh means 
that his pay would be frozen until the salary maximum of his 
new classification surpassed his current maximum.
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Minimum Qualifications;
University graduation* or membership in a recognzed 
professional a.ssociation,
Occupational Croups.
Actuarial Science
Agriculture* >
Architecture
Archival and Library Sciences 
Auditing
Biology and Bacteriology 
Chemistry and Physics 
Cornrnerc e 
Dentistry
Economics and Statistics
Education
Engineering
Foreign Service
Forestry
Geology
Home Economics
Law
Medicine
Meteorology
Nursing
Occupational and Physical Therapy 
Pharmacy
Psychology and Social Work 
Scientific R e gu 1 a t i o n 
Scientific Research 
Translation 
Veterinary Sc i enc e
ADMINISTRATIVE AND FOREIGN SERVICE CATEGORY
Descript1ons This category is composed of groups engaged in 
the conduct, ad.mini strati on and direction of government 
programmes, including internal management and service programmes, 
i.n which there is a significant requirement for analytical 
ability, judgement, human relations and orga.niziati.onal skills 
and supervisory ability or potential.
Mini.mum Qualifications*
Either university graduation o r  demonstrated capacity 
for administrative work and. knowledge equivalent to that normally 
attained through completion of secondary school education.
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Occupational Groups;
Adm.inistrative Services 
Admln.istrat.lve Training 
Computer Systems Administration 
B'inaneia]. Administration 
Information Services 
Organization and Methods 
Personnel Administration 
Programme Adrainistration 
Purchasing and Supply 
Welfare Programmes
TECHNICAL CATEGORY
Description; This category is composed of groups in which 
specialized techniques requireing highly developed stills are 
performed; it excludes those groups for which university 
graduation or equivalent qualif 1 cations rare normally required*
Minimum Qua!ifications:
Completion of four years of secondary school.
Occupational. Groups
Aircraft Pilots 
Drafting and Design 
Electronics 
General Technical
Photography
Primary Products Inspection 
Radio Operation
Scientific and Laboratory Technician
Ships’ Pilots
Ships’ Officers
Technical Inspection
Air Traffic Controller
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT CATEGORY
Description; This category is composed of groups in which the 
preparation, transcribing, transferring, systematizing and 
maintenance of records, reports and communication is performed 
either by manual or machine process. It includes positions in 
which there is a responsibility for supervision and for the 
direct application of rules and regulations*
Minimum Qualifications:
Completion of two years of secondary school.
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Occupational G r o up si
C o mrnun i cat i ons
Data Process in g
Clerical and Regulatory
Office Equipment Operation
Secretarial, Stenographic, Typing
Telephone Operation
OPERATIQNAI. CATEGORY
Description; This category is composed of grclips in which 
manual and related work of an unskilled, semi-vSkill.ed or 
skilled nature is performed, and supervised.
Occupational Groups;
Correctional Group 
F i r e f ight er s
General Labour a.nd Trades 
General Services
Heating, Power, and Stationary Plant
Hospital Services
T, i gh tkeepers
Postal Operations
Printing Trad es
Revenue Postal Operations
Ships Repair
Ships' Crews
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APPENDIX B
STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN PREPARING THE POINT RATING PLAN 
First Step
Determining the Types of Jobs to Evaluate
This involves deciding on whether the point rating 
plan will cover factory jobs only or both factory and office 
jobs, or office jobs only. Plans which are designed for jobs 
of a relatively narrow type such as factory or Operational, 
Clerical, or Supervisory, will result in a more accurate 
classification of the jobs. Plans that cover a wide range of 
jobs will tend to include a large number of factors and will 
not be as adequate as plans which cover a small range of jobs.
It is conceivable that a point rating plan which covers both 
office and factory type jobs will include factors which are 
not important for office jobs, i.e. Working Conditions and 
Physical Demands, and will include factors which are not 
important for factory type jobs, e.g. Contacts Factor.
Second Step
Collection of Job Information
This step involves the job analysis. The job analysis 
schedule or questionnaires must gather all the necessary infor­
mation on the factors to be rated.
Third Step
Selection of Factors
There are many factors which can be selected for point 
rating jobs. These factors vary whether the jobs to be point
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 105 -
rated will be factory type or clerical type. Given a certain 
type of jobs, certain rules should be followed in selecting 
the factors to be rated*
(a) The factors chosen must be ratable* that is 
significant differences in degrees of each 
factor can be defined and distinguished in
the jobs. For example, a factor such as super­
vision should vary from the supervision of no 
workers to responsibility for the supervision 
of all the employees in the work group. If, 
for example, supervision is not a characte­
ristic of the jobs under study, then super­
vision should not be chosen as a factor.
(b) The factors chosen must be important, that is, 
they must cover the major characteristics 
which are common to all jobs. In other words, 
the factors chosen must be present in all jobs 
and be useful in differentiating between jobs. 
The most important factors are education, 
experience, complexity, supervision, contacts, 
errors, working conditions, etc.
(c) The factors must not overlap in meaning. Each 
factor should be a measure of one and only one 
aspect of the job. For example, the factor of
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"accuracy" is almost the same as "effect of 
errors". If the definitions show that they 
overlap in meaning, then they will receive 
a double weight.
(d) The Factors should meet both employer and 
worker standards. The practicability of a 
point rating plan is based on the acceptance 
of its value by both management and workers.
The same principle should hold in the selection 
of job factors.
It should be remembered that the factors chosen 
do not describe all aspects of the jobs under 
study. It would be impossible to achieve such 
an objective. The factors chosen deal with 
those characteristics which are useful in 
differentiating between jobs or determining 
their relative values. In the Clerical and 
Regulatory Group, the Bureau of Classification 
Revision has chosen 5 main factors which they 
felt were common to all jobs and would bring 
in differences between jobs. These factors 
are, Knowledge (made up of experience and 
education) Complexity, Consequence of Error, 
Responsibility for Contacts, and Supervision.
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Fourth Step
Definition of Factors
The meaning of the factors selected must he clear 
to those who use them. The definition of the factor usually 
attempts to limit us to outlining the exact meaning of the 
factor. We have stated before that each factor selected should 
represent one aspect of the total job value, and they should 
not overlap. In order to measure job values accurately, the 
raters must have an understanding of each factor, so that 
they will all measure one and the same aspect of the total 
job value. For example, the definition of the Knowledge Factor 
in the Clerical and Regulatory Group Point Rating Plan is as 
follows* "This factor is used to measure the amount of 
experience and education required to perform the duties of 
the position effectively". The definition does not, however, 
stop there. Experience and Education are also defined as 
follows* "Experience refers to the minimum level of academic, 
technical or equivalent formal training required to provide 
the basis for the development of the skill and knowledge needed 
in the position."
Fifth Step
Defining Degrees for Each Factor
The point rating plan involves evaluating the job on 
each of the selected factors. This is done by using a series 
of degrees within each factor, each degree having a different 
point value. For example, the Experience Factor is sometimes
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composed of the following degrees*
1. Up to 1 month
2. Over 1 month
3. Over 3 months to 1 year
4. Over 1 year up to 3 years
5. Over 3 years
The factors selected are usually divided into degrees before 
the relative point values of the factors are determined. This 
is because the importance of each factor is somewhat easier to 
determine if the degrees have been established than with just 
the factor definition alone. The following rules are designed 
to aid in defining degrees for each factor in a rating scale*
(a) The number of degrees selected should be no 
more than are needed to differentiate adequately 
and fairly between all the jobs being rated.
(b) Degrees should be selected so that jobs fall 
at each level. It is unwise to have a degree 
at such a low level or such a high level that 
no job can be placed into it.
(c) Each degree should be cleaxly defined in terms 
which the worker can understand.
(d) Ambiguous terms should be avoided so that any 
misinterpretation will be eliminated.
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(e) Degrees should he written in objective terms* 
For example* the sentence "•••must lift a 
heavy load" is subjective* whereas "...must 
lift 75 lbs." is objective.
(f) Examples should be used as much as possible* 
This is one of the reasons why bench-mark job 
descriptions were provided as part of the 
standards prepared by the Bureau of Classi­
fication Revision. These bench-marks are 
helpful in that they exemplify the degrees of 
each factor and form points of reference for 
the rater to check his rating on a particular 
factor with a similar rating on the same 
factor for the bench-mark job.
Sixth Step
Determining the Relative Values of Job Factors 
The job factors should not all have the same weight 
or be considered equally important in measuring the value of 
a job. If, for example, the total possible number of points 
for a job is to be 1,000, the distribution of these points 
to each factor will depend on the relative importance of the 
factors in measuring the value of the job. In judging the 
relative value of each factor, it must be kept in mind that 
their relative values are to be judged as they contribute to 
the difficulty and worth of all jobs. The relative value of
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eaeh factor is usually determined by a panel of job evaluation 
experts who are knowledgeable in the jobs being point rated 
and know the importance of each factor* The Bureau of Classi­
fication Revision, in the Clerical and Regulatory Group, has 
assigned the following point values to each factor on the basis 
of its importance*
Knowledge Max* 350 points
Complexity Max. 300 points
Consequence of 
Errors Max. 100 points
Responsibility 
for Contacts Max. 100 points
Supervision Max. 150 points
The total number of points a job can obtain is, thus, 1,000.
Seventh Step
Assigning Point Values to Factor Degrees 
Once the relative value of each job factor has been 
obtained, the next step is to assign points to the degrees in 
each factor* These point values can be assigned by an arith­
metic progression, or a geometric progression. The arithmetic 
progression involves keeping the difference between each degree 
the same, e.g. 0, 15* 30, ^5* etc. The geometric progression 
is based on the premis that each degree increases a given 
percentage above the preceding one, e.g. 5» 10, 20, 40, 80, 
where each degree is double that of the preceding one. The 
Bureau of Classification Revision, in the point rating plan
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for the Clerical and Regulatory Group, has used the following 
method of assigning point values to degreesi the point values 
increase arithmetically as the degree of each factor increaseo 
The minimum point value for supervision is one-tenth of the 
maximum point value.
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